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Sodom's Shadow:
The Uncertain Line Between Public and
Private Morality
TODD

E. PETYS*

In citizens' debates about issues of public policy, we frequently encounter what this
Article calls the "divine accountability thesis"-the controversial claim that the divine
realm will punish a city, state, or nation unless it performs or proscribescertain forms
of conduct. Many of us reject that claim, but its persistent usage in numerous societies
over the past five thousand years teaches us a great deal about citizens' political selfconceptions. This Article begins by arguing that the divine accountability thesis
illustrates human beings' deeply ingrained tendency to regard their political
communities as discrete moral entities, individually deserving of punishment or reward.
Drawingfrom the work of Ronald Dworkin and others, the Article then argues that the
divine accountability thesis has an influential secular counterpart, consisting of two
widely shared perceptions that, taken together, compose what this Article calls the
"integration thesis." The integration thesis holds that our individual identities are
integrated with, and partially constructed by, the political communities to which we
belong, and that each of our political communities is akin to a personified moral agent
whose conduct reverberates in the individual lives of its integrated members. The
integration thesis and the divine accountability thesis often push in precisely the same
direction- namely, toward using the law as a means of stripping individuals of their
freedom to make certain moral decisions for themselves. Hoping to draw advocates of
these and other political viewpoints onto common ground, the Article proposes seven
questions that all scholars and citizens ought to ask when assessing whether a given
moral issue should be resolved collectively by a political community or should be left
for each individual to resolve on his or her own.

* H. Blair and Joan V. White Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. Many
thanks to Eric Andersen, Margaret Brinig, Herb Hovenkamp, Caroline Sheerin, and Lynn Wardle for
the insights they provided either in casual conversations or when commenting on earlier drafts. The
usual caveat is especially warranted here: the views expressed in this Article are not necessarily the
views of those who helped me refine my own thinking.
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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2oo9, after a physician who performed abortions at a
Kansas clinic was shot and killed in his church, a group of anti-abortion
protestors attended his funeral carrying signs stating "America is
doomed."' Earlier that year, an anti-abortion organization suggested that
the flooding of the Red River in North Dakota was God's way of
warning the North Dakota legislature to enact strict pro-life legislation?
In 2oo8, televangelist John Hagee predicted that God would permit
terrorist attacks on the United States if it supported a two-state solution
for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict3 and declared that Hurricane Katrina
had been sent by God as punishment for the sins of New Orleans. 4 In
2oo6, conservative legal scholar Charles Lugosi opened a law review
article with the warning that America's failure to repent of its sins would
bring "the inevitable judgment of God's anger" in the form of "bad
weather, disease, military defeat, and natural disasters."' Following the
terrorist attacks of September II, 2001, evangelical pastor Jerry Falwell
declared that God had permitted the attacks as punishment for the
activities of "the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the
lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the

i. See Monica Davey, In Wichita, a Shuttered Clinic Leaves Abortion Protestors at a Loss, N.Y.
TImws, June 8, 2009, at Ao.
2. See Steve Lefemine, Is God Sending a Message to North Dakota? And to the Nation? (Mar.
27, 2009), http://www.christianlifeandliberty.net/2009-03-27-God-Sending-Message-to-ND.doc.
3. See Holly Bailey, A Turbulent Pastor,NEWSWEEK, May 12, 2oo8, at 34.

4. See Maeve Reston, PastorSays He's Sorry for Anti-Catholic Rant, L.A. TIMEs, May 14, 2oo8,
at Ai5. Televangelist Pat Robertson comparably attributed Haiti's devastating earthquake in early
2010 to supernatural causes, asserting that "a long time ago" the people of Haiti "swore a pact to the
devil" in order to escape French rule, and that "ever since they have been cursed by one thing after the
other." The 700 Club (Christian Broadcasting Network television broadcast Jan. 33, 2030), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5TE99sAbwM&feature=fvw.
5. Charles I. Lugosi, The Rejection of Divine Law in American Jurisprudence: The Ten
Commandments, Trivia, and the Stars and Stripes, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. Rnv. 64!, 643 & fl.2 (2006).
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ACLU, People for the American Way-all of them who have tried to
secularize America." 6 Although such claims are most commonly
associated today with political and religious conservativism, that
correlation is not inevitable. Similar claims were frequently made by
opponents of slavery, for example, such as when George Mason argued
at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 that slavery "bring[s] the
judgment of heaven on a country" and that "[b]y an inevitable chain of
causes and effects, providence punishes national sins by national
calamities." 7
Those who link America's tragedies with divine condemnation of
America's public policies usually base their arguments on the ancient
religious texts of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Those texts contain
numerous stories in which God either threatens to harm or promises to
bless tribes, cities, or nations in accordance with their obedience to God's
commands.8 The ancient city of Sodom, for example, is famously said to
have been destroyed for its disobedience by "brimstone and fire from the
Lord out of heaven."' When accepted by religious believers as literal
historical truth, these stories cast a long shadow. Meteorological events
that our secular language still calls "acts of God," together with diseases,
military defeats, and other calamities, are all seen by these individuals as
various means by which the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition might
punish sinful political communities. From this vantage point, government
regulation in a host of morality-laden areas is essential in order to ensure
that the nation and its political subdivisions receive God's favorable
treatment.
For those who join me in rejecting such linkages between national
tragedies and divine punishment, it might be easy to assume that the
individuals who make these claims speak for only a handful of citizens.
Yet warnings of God's judgment upon cities, states, and nations build
upon two propositions that enjoy a significant constituency in the United
States: (i) that there is a divine realm that is actively engaged in the
world's affairs; and (2) that this divine realm often interacts with political
communities as discrete moral entities, causing the fortunes of some

6. See John F. Harris, God Gave U.S. 'What We Deserve,' Falwell Says, WASH. PoST, Sept. 14,
2001, at C3.

7. EDWARD J. LARSON & MICHAEL P. WINSHIP, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY FROM THE NOTES OF JAMES MADISON 130 (2005); see also infra notes IIo-iI (recounting
comparable statements by Benjamin Rush and Abraham Lincoln).
8. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 28:1-68 (stating that God will bless the Israelites if they obey God's
commandments, but that God will inflict a variety of horrors if they disobey those commandments);
Leviticus 26:3-39 (same); see also Jeremiah 18:7-io (stating that God blesses or punishes nations and
kingdoms based on whether they do good or evil); Jonah 3:I-lo (telling the story of the city of
Nineveh, which is spared from being overthrown only when its citizens heed Jonah's call for
repentance).

9. Genesis 19:24 (New American Standard).
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cities, states, and nations to rise and the fortunes of others to fall in
accordance with their public policies and conduct. I shall call these two
propositions, taken together, the "divine accountability thesis."' 0
Although they may disagree about the nature of the public policies and
conduct that might provoke divine judgment, many Americans are
receptive to arguments that presume a relationship between the behavior
of a city, state, or nation and that political entity's divine treatment.
Evidence of that receptiveness comes in a variety of forms. National
survey data, for example, describe a fairly prevalent worldview in which
invocations of the divine accountability thesis can easily resonate. A 2oo6
survey conducted by the Pew Research Center and the Pew Forum on
Religion & Public Life found that 35% of Americans believe the Bible is
the literal word of God, 32% believe the Bible should have more
influence on U.S. law than the will of the people, and 69% believe
"liberals have gone too far in trying to keep religion out of the schools
and government."" A 2001 Pew survey found that 8% of Americans
agreed with the claim that the terrorist attacks of September Iisignaled
"that God is no longer protecting the United States as much as in the
past."" Some additional percentage presumably believed the United
States continues to enjoy God's special protection. Indeed, a survey
conducted four years later by the Gallup Organization and the Baylor
Institute for Studies of Religion found that 18% of Americans believe
God favors the United States in worldly affairs; that same survey found
that 59% believe the federal government should defend Christian
values.3
The belief that the divine realm often interacts with humanity along
geopolitical boundaries also finds expression in the language of
American patriotism. In the days and weeks following the September ii
attacks, for example, Wall Street traders, Broadway casts and audiences,
baseball fans across the country, and countless other Americans
expressed their patriotism with the song "God Bless America," a song
whose title and lyrics solicit God's favorable treatment of the American
io. Cf RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 15 (1998) ("In the past, most of the stories that have incited nations to projects of selfimprovement have been stories about their obligations to one or more gods. For much of European
and American history, nations have asked themselves how they appear in the eyes of the Christian
God.").
ii. See Press Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press & Pew Forum on Religion &
Pub. Life, 69% Say Liberals Too Secular, 49% Say Conservatives Too Assertive, Many Americans
Uneasy with Mix of Religion and Politics 6, II, 13, 19 (Aug. 24, 2oo6), available at http://peoplepress.org/reports/pdf/287.pdf.
12. See Press Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press & Pew Forum on Religion &
Pub. Life, Post 9-II Attitudes: Religion More Prominent, Muslims More Accepted 2 (Dec. 6, 2001)

(internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/l4.pdf.
13. See Association of Religion Data Archives, Baylor Religion Survey, 2oo5, http://
www.thearda.com/lArchive/Files/Codebooks/BRS2oo5_CB.asp.
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nation-state. 4 Our national political leaders often close their speeches
with the same phrase." Lest one think that most Americans ascribe no
real content to those words, one should recall the national furor that
erupted in 2008 when a video was released of a sermon preached by
Jeremiah Wright, pastor of the Chicago church that then-presidential
candidate Barack Obama had long attended.6 After listing wrongs that
the United States had committed against Native Americans, Japanese
Americans, and African Americans, Wright incredulously continued:
[A]nd then [the government] wants us to sing "God Bless America."
No, no, no. Not "God bless America"; God Damn America! That's in
the Bible, for killing innocent people. God Damn America for treating
her citizens as less than human. God Damn America as long she keeps
trying to act like she is God and she is supreme."
Describing the nation's lamentable record on race was nothing new.
Inviting God's judgment on the nation for its racial evils was seen as a
different matter indeed.
This Article aims to establish three overarching propositions. First,
we greatly underestimate the divine accountability thesis's influence on
the nation's public-policy debates and on the political impulse to restrict
individuals' moral autonomy if we assume that the thesis is
inconsequentially embraced only by a marginalized few. From the
emergence of the world's first city-states in southern Mesopotamia to the
presence of nationalistic Christianity in America today, variants of the
divine accountability thesis have flourished across a wide range of
cultures and civilizations. The historical prevalence of that thesis tells us
a great deal about the construction of human beings' communal
identities and about the pressures that our constitutional system must
bear as politicians and judges demarcate the realms of public and private
morality. Second, the divine accountability thesis has a secular
counterpart that is widely embraced in secular and religious circles alike.
That secular counterpart often pushes in precisely the same direction as

14. See Cesar G. Soriano, "God Bless America" Roars Back After Tragedy, USA TODAY, Sept. 18,
2001, at Cii.

15. President George W. Bush, for example, sometimes underscored the sentiment by expressing
the hope that God would "continue to bless" America. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of
the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), transcriptavailable at http://www.cnn.com/2oo3/ALLPOLITICS/oi/
28/sotu.transcript.
16. See Scott Helman & Sasha Issenberg, Voters' Views Diverge over Obama Flap; Leadership on
Race Praised, Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2008, at Ai, available at http://www.boston.com/
news/nation/articles/2oo8/o3/2i/voters.views-divergeover.obama-flap/; Jane LampmanDid Obama's
Pastor Preach Hate?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 28, 2008, at A3, available at http://
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2oo8/o328/po3so7-ussc.html.
17. Rev. Jeremiah wright, Sermon: Confusing God and Government (Apr. 13, 2003), transcript
available at http://www.blackpast.org/?q=2oo8-rev-jeremiah-wright-confusing-god-and-government
(emphasis added); see also YouTube, Bill Moyers-Rev. wright's "God Damn America" in Context,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFYeTrQMHA8 (last visited Apr. 27, 2olo).
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the divine accountability thesis-namely, toward using the law as a
means of stripping individuals of their freedom to make certain moral
decisions for themselves. Third, productive dialogue between advocates
of the divine accountability thesis, its secular counterpart, and other
political worldviews is not hopelessly precluded by those groups'
differing religious and ideological commitments. To the contrary, we can
increase the likelihood of constructive constitutional and political debate
by identifying a series of inquiries that most scholars and citizensregardless of their presuppositions -are likely to embrace as relevant to
determining whether the morality of a given form of conduct should be
resolved collectively by the political community or should be left for each
individual to resolve on his or her own.
In Part I.A, I demonstrate that, for more than five thousand years,
members of a wide variety of civilizations have believed that a divine
realm regards their political communities as discrete moral entities,
individually deserving of punishment or reward. In Part I.B, I argue that
Americans' political usage of the divine accountability thesis as a
justification for limiting individuals' moral autonomy can be traced to the
emergence of nationalistic Christianity in the sixteenth century. In Part
I.C, I consider two primary obstacles that the Constitution places in the
path of those Americans who wish to rely upon the divine accountability
thesis when shaping public policy on matters of moral concern.
In Part II, I argue that the divine accountability thesis has an
influential secular counterpart. To demonstrate that the desire to limit
individuals' moral autonomy is not limited to those who hold certain
religious beliefs, I contend in Part II.A that even political liberalism
manifests a desire to use government institutions to help define the
moral lives that citizens ought to lead. I then argue in Part II.B that the
secular impulse to make political judgments about the morality of
individuals' conduct flows from two widely held perceptions that
together function as the divine accountability thesis's secular
counterpart: (i) our individual identities are integrated with, and
partially constructed by, the political communities to which we belong;
and (2) each of our political communities is akin to a personified moral
agent whose conduct reverberates in the individual lives of its integrated
members. I call these two perceptions, taken together, the "integration
thesis."
In Part III, I identify ways in which our pluralistic society can find
common ground in the effort to distinguish between those occasions
when individuals ought to be left free to make their own moral choices
and those occasions when government intervention is warranted. In Part
IIIA, I dispel the dialogue-stifling misperception that advocates of the
divine accountability thesis believe the government ought to throw its
weight behind all of the divine realm's expectations. No matter what
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their moral perspective, nearly everyone-religious or secular-is
working to distinguish between those public matters on which
government action is appropriate and those private matters on which it is
not. In Part IIJ.B, I propose seven questions that all scholars and citizens
ought to ask when deciding whether a given moral issue should be
deemed a matter of public or private concern.

I. GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AND RELIGIOUs BELIEFS
From the emergence of the world's first city-states to the present
day, one finds a common tendency within political communities to
embrace some version of the divine accountability thesis." In both
ancient and modern civilizations, one finds people powerfully inclined to
perceive that there are deities or spirits whose particular foci of concern
are the political bodies and physical territories with which individuals
most closely identify, and whose benevolence must actively be cultivated
lest those deities or spirits bring harm to that polity or region. Even if we
deny its literal truth, the divine accountability thesis's historical
prevalence suggests that we make a profound mistake if we suppose that,
in America today, that thesis exerts little influence on the nation's
political and constitutional discourse. Contemplating the divine
accountability thesis's persistent and widespread usage helps us
understand the way in which many citizens conceive of themselves and
their place in the nation-state, as well as understand the recurrence of
certain patterns in American constitutional litigation and the pressures
our constitutional system must bear.

A. THE DIVINE ACCOUNTABILITY

THESIS's HISTORICAL PREVALENCE

Without naively attempting to touch upon all of the world's major
civilizations and religious traditions, consider the following brief survey
of some of the ways in which people's religious beliefs and political
interests have intersected throughout human history, beginning with the
world's earliest city-states in southern Mesopotamia.
i.
Ancient Sumer
The world's first city-states appeared in ancient Sumer in the latter
half of the fourth millennium BCE. The Sumerians believed that each
of their major cities was home to one of the gods of the Sumerian

pantheon20 and that these deities represented their respective cities in the

18. See supra text accompanying note

io (defining the divine accountability thesis).

CITY-STATE IN FIVE CULTURES, at
xiii (Robert Griffeth & Carol G.Thomas eds., 1981); Song Nai Rhee, Sumerian City-States, in THE
CIrY-sTATE IN FIVE CULTURES, supra, at I, x.
19. See Robert Griffeth & Carol G. Thomas, Introduction to THE

20. See HARRIET CRAWFORD, SUMER AND THE SUMERIANS 28 (2d ed. 2004); see also HENRIETrA
MCCALL, THE LEGENDARY PAST: MESOPOTAMIAN MYTHs 25 (1990) ("Because life was precarious, it was
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council of the gods, where cities' and humanity's fates were determined.)
Loyalty to a city's god played a prominent role in giving that city's
inhabitants a sense of cohesion and independence; a city's temple was by
far its most important structure22 and a city's residents found it difficult to
imagine building political alliances with those who worshipped other
deities." Each city's fate depended upon the power, decisions, and
behavior of its god. A city's decline or downfall might be attributed to its
deity's decision to abandon it,24 for example, while war between cities
might be attributed to the deities' anger. The weighty responsibility of
pleasing a city's god fell primarily on the city's ruler, who regularly
honored the deity with rituals, ceremonies, and offerings. As one
historian wrote, "any ruler's first responsibility was to nurture the city's
god, for without his or her favor the place was doomed."2
2.
Ancient Israel
At the heart of the ancient Israelites' oral traditions and religious
texts was the belief that, if the Israelites disobeyed the commands of their
deity, Yahweh, he would strip them of their land and allow them to be
scattered in foreign territories; but if the Israelites honored their
obligations to Yahweh, he would bless them with land of their own. 8
When the Israelites suffered military defeats and lost territory to their
conquerors, the losses thus were attributed to the people's sinfulness and

prudent for cities to be guarded by a special god who was responsible for both the city and its
people.").
21. See CRAWFORD, supra note 2o; see also SAMUEL NOAH KRAMER, SUMERIAN MYTHOLOGY: A
STUDY OF SPIRITUAL AND LITERARY ACHIEVEMENT IN THE TIRD MILLENNIUM B.C. 46-52, 59-63 (1961)
(recounting specific Sumerian myths relating to gods and the netherworld and the organization of the
universe).
22. See Rhee, supra note 19, at I, 12-13.
23. See id. at 24.
24. See, e.g., MCCALL, supra note 20, at 6o (recounting the Epic of Ezra, a myth explaining
Babylon's decline).
25. See, e.g., id. at 61-62 (recounting the Epic of Ezra, which further describes the ensuing war
between Babylonian cities).
26. See CRAWFORD, supra note 20, at 28; Rhee, supra note 19, at 19.
27. CRAWFORD, supra note 20, at 31; see also Rhee, supra note 19, at 19 (stating that failing to
keep a city's deity appeased "would incur divine wrath and bring calamity to the city-state").
28. See SIEGFRIED HERRMANN, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL IN OLD TESTAMENT TIMES 33 (John Bowen
trans., rev. & enlarged ed. 1981) (1975) (stating that a belief in God's promise of a homeland in
Palestine was central to the Israelites' self-understanding); NIELS PETER LEMCHE, THE ISRAELITES IN
HISTORY AND TRADITION 86-93 (1998) (discussing the central components of the Israelites' religious
narratives); see also, e.g., Deuteronomy 4:i (linking the Israelites' obedience to God and the Israelites'
possession of the land that God wished to give them); Joshua 23:16 (New American Standard) ("When

you transgress the covenant of the Lord your God, . .. then the anger of the Lord will burn against
you, and you shall perish quickly from off the good land which He has given you."); I Kings 9:6-7
(New American Standard) ("But if you or your sons indeed turn away from following Me, and not
keep My commandments and My statutes which I have set before you, . . . then I will cut off Israel
from the land which I have given them. .. )
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Yahweh's retribution. Some of the Israelites' religious texts were
written, for example, to identify the sins that led to the fall of the
northern kingdom of Israel at the hands of the Assyrians in 721 BCE,
and to describe the conduct that was necessary for the Israelites to regain
Yahweh's favor.30 Other texts carried the same twin burdens with respect
to Babylonia's defeat of the southern kingdom of Judah and its capital
city of Jerusalem in 597 BCE." The ancient Israelites firmly believed that
their political autonomy and prosperity depended entirely upon whether
they faithfully obeyed Yahweh's commands."
3. Ancient Greece
In the ancient Greek world described in the Homeric epics, society
was structured around aristocratic warriors (basileis) and their families,
servants, and companions.3 3 The basileis regularly sought the gods' aid
for themselves and their households, such as by leaving offerings in
private graves and tombs.34 Beginning in the eighth century BCE,
however, the basileis began to band together and form integrated
political structures, thereby shifting Greek society toward domination by
city-states." As this shift occurred, the basileis and other leaders of the
emerging cities redirected their religious energies away from making
private offerings with the hope of receiving benefits for their individual
households, toward leaving offerings in public sanctuaries and temples
with the hope of receiving benefits for the larger community.36 Indeed,
the construction of elaborate temples in which such offerings could be
made was "among the very first manifestations of the polis." 37 The
Greeks believed that particular gods were attached to the territories on
which the sanctuaries and temples were built and that, if properly
29. See JAMES M. EFIRD, THE OLD TESTAMENT WRITINGS: HISTORY, LITERATURE, AND
INTERPRETATION 147 (1982); VICTOR H. MATTHEWS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANCIENT ISRAEL IO8 (2002).
30. See, e.g., 2 Kings 17:7 (New American Standard) (stating that the kingdom of Israel fell to the
Assyrians "because the sons of Israel had sinned against the Lord their God"); see also EFIRD, Supra
note 29, at 71-77 (discussing the Old Testament book of Deuteronomy).
31. See, e.g., 2 Kings 21:1-16 (describing the sins leading to the fall of the kingdom of Judah); see

also EFIRD, supra note 29, at 65-67 (discussing the Old Testament book of Leviticus).
32. See LEMCHE, supra note 28, at 86-93.
33. See FRANqOIS DE POLIGNAC, CULTS, TERRITORY, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE GREEK CITY-STATE 6-7
(Janet Lloyd trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1995) (1984); see also RICHARD SEAFORD. RECIPROCITY AND
RITUAL: HOMER AND TRAGEDY IN THE DEVELOPING Crry-STATE 13 (1994) ("Homeric society is
characterized by the solidarity of the household and by the near absence of collective organizations
transcending households.").
34. See SEAFORD, supra note 33, at 194-97.
35. See DE POLIGNAC, supra note 33, at 58-59. Fully fledged Greek city-states were well

established by the middle of the fifth century BCE. See Carol G. Thomas, The Greek Polis, in THE

CITY-STATE INFIVE CULTURES, supra note 19, at 31, 38.
36. See DE POLIGNAC, supra note 33, at 11-15; SEAFORD, supra note 33, at 196-7; see also id. at 194
(stating that the good of the community, rather than the good of the individual or of the household,
became "the new standard of individual morality").
37. SEAFORD, supra note 33, at 197.
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courted, these gods would come to the aid of those who resided in that
area. Most of the Greeks' sanctuaries and temples (with the temple in
Athens standing as the major exception) were erected outside each city,
so that those religious structures could mark the boundaries of the land
that each city claimed for itself.39 City officials were charged with carrying
out certain cultic duties,40 although the cities' other residents also
regularly tended to the deities by participating in cults and festivals. 4'
Joining in those religious activities "set the seal upon membership of the
society, thereby defining an early form of citizenship." 42
4. The Early Christians
Part J.B will discuss modern Christianity's geopolitical dimensions,
but a few words should be said here about one of the ways in which some
of the political impulses that characterized other ancient religious
systems found expression within early Christianity. In the first few
centuries CE-an era of harsh religious persecution -Christians

often

gathered at the graves of their martyred predecessors, whom the faithful
called "saints." 43 After Constantine brought state-sponsored persecution
of Christians to an end, the title of saint was extended to include not only
those who had been martyred, but also those who had lived exemplary
lives." Christians flocked to the saints' tombs, where the saints were
believed to be present on earth through their bodily remains, and
available to intercede with God on behalf of those who sought their
assistance.45 Many of those deceased Christians came to be seen as patron
saints who interceded with God on behalf of the members of designated
polities.46

Consider, for example, Saint Genevieve, the patron saint of Paris. In
the fifth century, Genevibve reportedly led Parisian women in prayer and
fasting when the city was threatened by approaching Huns; when the
Huns failed to claim the city, Paris's preservation was attributed to
Genevieve's intervention. 7 Genevieve's aid on that occasion was not
38. See DE POLIGNAC, supra note 33, at 20, 43.

39. See id. at 33-34.
40. See Thomas, supra note 35, at 55-56.
41. See id.at56.
42. DE POLIGNAC, supra note 33, at 153.
43.

See KENNETH L. WOODWARD, MAKING SAINTS: How THE CATHOLIC CHURCH DETERMINES WHO

BECOMES A SAINT, WHO DOESN'T, AND WHY 50-52 (1990); David H. Farmer, Introduction to I BUTLER'S

LIVES OF SAINTS, at xi, xiii (Paul Burns ed., 1995).
44. See WOODWARD, supra note 43, at 54; Farmer, supra note 43, at xiii.
45. See PETER BROWN, THE CULT OF THE SAINTS: ITS RISE AND FUNCTION IN LATIN CHRISTIANITY

3-

6 (1981).

46. See generally BUTLER'S LIVES OF PATRON SAINTS 3-22 (Michael Walsh ed., Harper & Row

1987) (1756-1759) (listing the patron saints of numerous countries, cities, and places, as well as those
of professions and other concerns).
47. See MOSHE SLUHOVSKY, PATRONESS OF PARIS: RITUALS OF DEVOTION IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE
11-12 (1998).
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forgotten. In 885, nearly four centuries after her death, Genevibve's
remains were carried to a high point in Paris when the city was
threatened by Norman armies; the Parisians prevailed, thereby
"inaugurat[ing] a tradition of public invocations of Sainte Genevive for
the well-being of the entire city of Paris and its inhabitants."" Her relics
were brought out when Paris faced an epidemic of "[b]urning [s]ickness"
in the twelfth century,49 her relics were paraded through the city more
than two dozen times when floods threatened Paris between the
thirteenth and seventeenth centuries,o her relics were taken through the
streets when civil war erupted in the fifteenth century,"' her aid was
repeatedly sought when the city's crops faltered in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, 2 and her relics were carried through Paris yet
again as German forces approached the city in 1940.53 Such invocations of
patron saints offered Christians the opportunity to interact with their
deity in ways that bore the strong imprint of their geopolitical
attachments.
5.

China

For thousands of years, people in China worshipped earth godsterritorial gods who were believed to reside in the ground around the
altars where they were worshipped, and who would inflict harm on the
land if they were not properly honored.54 In the sixth and seventh
centuries CE, city-god cults began to emerge around the spirits of
military and political heroes." City residents believed that their localities'
gods "could rescue them from famine, epidemic, warfare, and demons of
all kinds."56 The Chinese believed that these gods served as "local
officials in a centralized celestial bureaucracy closely resembling the
earthly bureaucracy of [those] times, and that, in addition, they were
colleagues and allies of human magistrates and prefects."" Because it
often was local political officials who rose to the status of gods following
their deaths, city-dwellers who desired the gods' protection in the
afterlife were doubly incentivized to behave as good citizens. 8 Such
beliefs continued into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with every

48. Id. at 17.
49. See id. at 22.
50. See id. at 32-36.

51. See id. at 47-48.
52. See id. at 57, 96-98.
53. See id. at 209.
54. See David Johnson, The City-God Cults of T'ang and Sung China, 45 HARV. J. AsIATIC STUD.

363, 397 (1985).
55. See id. at 389-94.
56. Id. at 449.
57. Id. at 435-36.
58. See C.K.

YANG,

CHINESE SOClETY THE FIRST
BEHAVIOR 156-58 (1961).

RELIGION IN

ANALYSIS OF CHINESE RELIGIOUS

COMPREHENSIVE
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major Chinese city boasting its own city-god temple.59 Even today,
outside mainland China, people sometimes pay homage to the patron
gods of their villages and cities, seeking protection from sickness, crop
failures, and other communal threats.60
6. Africa
The south-central African countries of Malawi, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe have long been home to territorial cults-cults practiced by
those who reside in a "particular land area, so that membership [in a] cult
is in the final instance a consequence of residence and not kinship or
ethnic designation." 6 1 Individuals who move into a territory in which a
cult is practiced are expected to submit themselves to the cults'
directives. The cults' objects of worship vary, ranging from gods, to
nature spirits, to the spirits of deceased human beings.' The cults'
leaders engage in rituals that are aimed primarily at avoiding "droughts,
floods, blights, pests and epidemic diseases" that threaten the land on
which the cults' practitioners live, and they issue orders concerning
methods of production, limitations on fishing, and other matters that
affect the land's long-term sustainability.64 Murder, incest, and other acts
deemed immoral also fall within the cults' concern; when natural
disasters strike, they usually are believed to be the consequence of cult
members' wrongdoing.65 "Reduced to their core," one scholar writes,
"territorial cults are based on the idea that the satisfactory functioning of
the environment depends not only on the directly ecological activity of
man but also on the satisfactory functioning of society as a whole." 66

B.

THE DIVINE ACCOUNTABILITY THESIS INMODERN CHRISTIANITY

The global and historical prevalence of the divine accountability
thesis suggests that, when modern-day Americans link the United
States's successes and tragedies to divine action, they are expressing
communal self-perceptions that-if five thousand years of history are any
indication-are profoundly human. Once those who are inclined to
believe in a divine realm begin to identify themselves as members of a
political community, they often are powerfully inclined also to believe
59. See id.
6o. See, e g., DAVID K. JORDAN, GODS, GHOSTS, AND ANCESTORS: THE FOLK RELIGION OF A
TAIWANESE VILLAGE 42-45 (1972) (discussing King Guo, the god of the Taiwanese village that the
author visited in the 1960s).
61. GUARDIANS OF THE LAND: ESSAYS ON CENTRAL AFRICAN TERRITORIAL CULTS I (J.M.
Schoffeleers ed., Mambo Press 1979) (1978) [hereinafter GUARDIANS OF THE LAND].
62. See id. at 5.

63. See Terence Ranger, TerritorialCults in the History of CentralAfrica, 14 J. AFR. HisT. 581, 582
('973).
64. See GUARDIANS OF THE LAND, supra note 6i, at 2-4.
65. See id. at 566. Id. at 41.
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that the divine realm perceives their political community as a single
moral entity and will cause that entity to suffer or prosper in accordance
with its conduct. Those beliefs, in turn, often fuel a desire to use the law
as a means of restricting individuals' moral autonomy. When told with
greater particularity, the story of the divine accountability thesis's usage
in America begins with the Protestant Reformation in sixteenth-century
Europe.
i. Nationalistic Christianityin Europe
As students of the Middle Ages well know, western Christendom
and the Holy Roman Empire tenuously coexisted for many centuries.6
Western Christendom was led by the Pope; after Pope Gregory VII
declared the Church's independence from the Crown in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries, Christendom itself became a lawmaking and lawenforcing entity, with its own canon law taking jurisdiction over a wide
range of conduct and concerns.6' The Holy Roman Empire, led by a
monarchical secular authority, supervised a parallel system of legal rules
and institutions.6 9 Prior to the Reformation, Christendom succeeded in
gradually weakening its secular rival by fueling nationalist sentiments in
France and elsewhere-but it thereby helped spark the flames of
nationalistic patriotism that ultimately helped to undermine the authority
of Christendom itself.
The Reformation deeply fractured Christendom's empire-spanning
governmental structures and prompted powerful nationalistic
associations between states and the newly emerging Protestant
denominations. In states where Protestantism took hold, the Catholic
Church was stripped of its governmental power, leaving secular

67. See generally I

ROLAND H. BAINTON, CHRISTENDOM: A SHORT HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY AND

ITs

IMPACT ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION-FROM THE BIRTH OF CHRIST TO THE REFORMATION 177 (Harper &

Row 1966) (1964) (stating that a twelfth-century agreement tried to ease the tensions between the two
authorities by declaring that the Church, rather than the emperor, would appoint its own bishops, but
that the bishops would then "swear fealty to the emperor"); NORMAN TANNER, THE CHURCH IN THE
LATER MIDDLE AGES, at xvii-xix (2oo8) (describing the geographical reach of Christendom prior to the

schism between eastern and western Christendom in the eleventh century).
68. See I BAINTON, supra note 67, at 201-02 (stating that "[b]oth Church and king had their

separate courts and systems of law" and that, through its canon law, the Church claimed jurisdiction
over such matters as inheritance, marriage, perjury, usury, and "all cases involving clerics"); ROLAND
H. BAINTON, THE REFORMATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 4-1I (1952) [hereinafter BAINTON. THE
REFORMATION] (discussing Christendom and the Papal Revolution).
69. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 56-61

(1974) (discussing

the

emergence of a body of secular law to compete with canon law).
70. See I BAINTON, supra note 67, at 225 (stating that England, France, and Spain were the first

three nations to emerge in the Empire in the fourteenth century, with each defining itself by its
traditions, language, and territory, and that these emerging nations found themselves at odds with
both of Europe's two supranational powers-the empire and the Church); BAINTrON, THE
REFORMATION, supra note 68, at 12 ("The papacy was speedily undone by its very successes in
weakening the empire and in building up the emerging national states.").
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authorities as the sole source of civil and criminal law." Yet with the
exception of the Anabaptists (who believed that Christians should
withdraw from the political realm and that states should take no real
interest in the religions practiced within their borders), Protestants had
no desire to permit religious pluralism. To the contrary, "[ulne foi, un
roi, une loi-one faith, one king, and one law-was still the model for
any sound body politic."73
The Protestant nexus between government and religion first
appeared within individual cities. Ulrich Zwingli helped found the
Reformed Church in Zurich, for example, with the hope of making that
city "a theocratic community resembling that of ancient Israel, resting to
a degree on blood and soil."" John Calvin helped found the Reformed
Church in Geneva with the aim of establishing that city as "the new
Israel of God," with "the laity and the clergy, the Town Council and the
ministers ... all equally imbued with the same high purpose."" As
individual states shook themselves loose from the Holy Roman Empire's
control, comparable impulses expressed themselves on a larger scale.
Sweden adopted Lutheranism as the world's first Protestant national
church in 1527,6 for example, and in the ensuing centuries it fashioned
itself as a new Israel, chosen by God to be blessed with "special divine
favor" so long as the Swedes did not provoke God's wrath with their

sins.77
By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, membership in
Europe's emerging national states was defined by two primary features:
sharing a common ruler and participating in the activities of a state's
established church.' 8 Clergy fueled the latter marker of national selfdefinition, favorably contrasting their own nation's religious teachings
with those of the established churches in other, misguided countries. 79
The Old Testament became "an increasingly important source of
political language," as religious and secular leaders "found a prototype of
nation in Old Testament Israel."" Nations individually lay claim to being
the special focus of God's favor.

71. See BERMAN, supra note 69, at 63-64 (discussing the Protestant reformers' "delegalizing" of
the church).
72. See BAINTON, THE REFORMATION, supra note 68, at 78, 99-0oo, 213.
73. Id. at 141-42.

74. Id. at 88.
75. Id. at 117-18.

76. See id. at 156.
77. PASI IHALAINEN, PROTESTANT NATIONS REDEFINED: CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL
IDENTITY IN THE RHETORIC OF THE ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SWEDISH PUBLIC CHURCHES, 1685-1772, at 86,
583 (2Q05).

78. See id. at II.
79. See id. at 12.
8o. Id. at 8,86-0.
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Accompanying that self-association with Israel was the fear that the
nation would suffer God's judgment if, like the Israel of the Old
Testament, it failed to obey God's commands. Clergy repeatedly warned
that God would refuse to bless any nation unless its people repented of
their sins." In a sermon delivered in 1704, for example, a Church of
England minister declared:
This is a Truth which all Christians are agreed in, That National
Wickedness is the Cause of National Punishments .... [T]his we may
be sure of, that every publick Affliction which a People suffers, is the
just Desert of their National Crimes.... God, who is perfectly holy, is
oblig'd, by the Rules of his eternal Justice, to punish Nations, as well as
particular Persons, according to their Doings .... .
While individuals' sins could be punished either in this life or the next,
the minister reasoned, "National Wickedness must be accounted for in
this present World, this being the only State in which a Nation, as such,
can possibly be punish'd." 3 In a 1724 sermon delivered to the House of
Commons, another Anglican minister starkly reminded his listeners of
Sodom's fate: "The Ruins of Sodom and Gomorrah are such Horrid
Monuments of God's Indignation against Popular Impurity, that, surely,
the most Intrepid, or the most Lethargic Man alive, cannot turn his Eyes
towards them, without Shivering and Shrinking under the very First
appearance of them."84 Another Anglican minister told the House of
Commons in 1742 that God would "continue [England] as a flourishinF
people" only if the House mandated proper respect for the Sabbath.
When the Enlightenment began to take hold, clergy warned against the
emerging tendency to "attribute natural Causes" to diseases and other
phenomena that the national church identified as God's ways of
"displaying his Vengeance upon a wicked and gainsaying People."
As the eighteenth century neared its close, those warnings gradually
became less frequent. As Pasi Ihalainen puts it, "the nation was
increasingly understood not so much as a sinning community fearing
divine punishments but as an active political agent advancing the
common good in this world."8' National leaders discovered that it was in
their interest to encourage a strong sense of national patriotism-the

81. See id. at 86, 590.

82.

W. TUCKER, THE CAUSE OF

GOD's

WRATH: OR, A CALL TO REPENTANCE, FOR THE NATIONAL SIN

OF SACRILEGE I, 19 (London, 1704).

83. Id. at 19-20.
84. WILLIAM LUPTON, NATIONAL SINS FATAL TO PRINCE AND PEOPLE 5. I1 (1724) (sermon delivered
to the House of Commons at St. Margaret's in Westminster on Jan. 30, 1724).
8_. WILLIAM STUKELEY, NATIONAL JUDGMENTS THE CONSEQUENCE OF A NATIONAL PROFANATION OF
THE SABBATH I--6, 21-22 (1742) (sermon delivered to the House of Commons at St. Margaret's in

Westminster on Jan.

30, 1724).

86.

SAMUEL ECCLES, NATIONAL SINS THE

87.

IHALAINEN,

supra note 77, at 4.

CAUSE OF NATIONAL

JUDGMENTS

3 (r750).
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kind of affection for one's country that makes one willing to die for it."
References to Israel in national churches' sermons thus were tempered
with the language of national patriotism; maintaining national unity
through religious tolerance became more important than rigidly adhering
to religious orthodoxy; and religion became increasingly focused on
God's relationship with the individual rather than God's relationship
with the nation." The modern age of the European nation-state had
dawned.'
2.
Nationalistic Christianityin America
The intersection of religion and nationalism saw a similar arc of
development in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century America. The
Puritans who settled in America in the early i6oos brought with them the
conviction "that God's redemptive efforts centered on England and
English Christianity." 9' The Puritans were equally convinced, however,
that Reformation principles had not been sufficiently implemented
within the Church of England and that the church needed to be purged
of its remaining vestiges of Catholicism.9 They believed that settling for a
time in a remote land offered them the opportunity to demonstrate how
God wished England's civil and religious leaders to govern. Like the
ancient Israelites, they believed they had entered a covenant with God:
"If they kept their end of the bargain, they expected God to bless them
and earthly governors to treat them fairly. If they fell short, they
understood that punishment would be their due." 93 They anticipated that
God would richly bless the new settlements for their faithfulness and that
English officials then would call Puritan leaders back to their homeland
to implement the reforms that had so plainly won God's favor in
America.94

88. See E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 178o: PROGRAM, MYTH, REALITY 8o-85
(1990).

89. See IHALAINEN, supra note 77, at 581-82, 590-93; see also BERMAN, supra note 69, at 68-69
(noting the simultaneous post-Enlightenment emergence of individualism and nationalism); BAINTON,
THE REFORMATION, supra note 68, at 222 (stating that religious tolerance increased as people's interests
shifted "from orthodoxy to patriotism"); JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE PRIESTLY KINGDOM: SOCIAL
ETHICS As GOSPEL 141 (1984) (stating that the Renaissance and the Reformation helped bring "'about
the modem sense of nationhood, replacing 'Christendom' as the definition of cultural identity and
historical meaning").
90. See generally HOBSBAWM, supra note 88, at 14-19, 80-92 (discussing the emergence of the
nation-state in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries).
91. Conrad Cherry, The Colonial Errand into the Wilderness, in GOD'S NEW ISRAEL: RELIGIOUS
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN DESTINY 25, 25 (Conrad Cherry ed., 1998).
92. See EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: ROGER WILLIAMS IN AMERICA 10 (1991);
PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS IO-I2 (1964).

93. WILLIAM

MARTIN,

VWrrH GOD ON OUR SIDE: THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUs RIGHT IN AMERICA I

(1996).

94. See GAUSTAD, Supra note 92, at 21; MILLER, supra note 92, at II.
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The Puritans thus set about creating townships in which church and
state-although formally separate entities-were closely allied in the

effort to identify and procure the conduct that God desired.95 Little
distinction was drawn between law and morality; it was the job of
colonial authorities "to translate the divine moral law into criminal
statutes."" Even private immoral acts constituted a threat to the
community's welfare, because such acts could bring God's wrath upon
the entire community.97 The threat of divine punishment was especially
potent when a community's members knew about individuals' sins and
did nothing to prevent them from recurring:
The toleration of notorious wickedness, including notorious
heresy, . .. created the possibility that not only the evildoer but also
those who tolerated the evil would suffer God's judgment. New
England Puritans found frequent evidence that God did not necessarily

reserve righteous judgments until the world's end. So far as they could
see, he visited evildoers with stern doses of present wrath. . . . It
required no immense step for ... Puritans to see the divine hand of
judgment poised over the community when it harbored wickedness.
Portents of God's judgment were ever close at hand. 8
By the mid-16oos, however, the Puritans had become profoundly
discouraged-many of those portents of divine judgment had been
realized and the Puritans believed their sins were surely to blame. As
Perry Miller observes, Puritan writings from that era "recite the long list
of afflictions an angry God had rained upon them, surely enough to
prove how abysmally they had deserted the covenant: crop failures,
epidemics, grasshoppers, caterpillars, torrid summers, arctic winters,
Indian wars, hurricanes, shipwrecks, accidents, and (most grievous of all)
unsatisfactory children."9 9 Enthusiasm for the Puritans' project waned;
"[r]eligious dissent and diversity increased [and] church membership
shrank.""
Puritans and non-Puritans alike were stirred to renewed religious
fervor in the early eighteenth century. A 1727 earthquake in New
England prompted many terrified residents to flock to their churches,
where clergy told them that it was only by God's mercy that no one had
died in the quake, and that New Englanders needed to repent of their

95. See TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS

LIBERTY 53-62 (1998).
96. David H. Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of Morals in Early America, in LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 201, 211 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
97. See id.at 217.
98. HALL, supra note 95, at 59-60.
99. MILLER, supra note 92, at 6; see, e.g., Michael Wigglesworth, God's Controversy with New
England (1662), reprinted in GOD'S NEW ISRAEL, supra note 91, at 42 (expressing such sentiments in

verse).
Too. MARTIN,

supra note 93, at 2.
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sins before God dealt them a more serious blow.' During the Great
Awakening that began several years later, preachers delivered similar
messages. George Whitefield told congregations in South Carolina, for
example, that an epidemic of smallpox and yellow fever in Charleston
had been God's punishment for the people's sins, and that worse would
soon come if the people did not change their ways. 0 2 When a fire burned
a third of Charleston later that year, a local minister compared the
tragedy to the fiery destruction of Sodom. 3
It was during the Great Awakening that Americans first became
aware of the stirrings of a nascent nationalism, and that a link began to
be forged in their minds between the colonies' joint conduct and their
common fate at the hands of the divine.0 4 Those national bonds grew
stronger, of course, in the years leading up to the Revolution. As
Americans' geopolitical attachments expanded in scope, their perception
of the community that shared a singular relationship with God expanded
as well. Americans increasingly prayed not just for God's blessing on
their local community, but on the nation as a whole.' The original
Puritan ambition of providing a model for reforming the Church of
England was replaced with two broader ambitions bearing the marks of
the new American nationalism: the religious ambition of having all
American Christians "play the crucial role in advancing the Kingdom of
God on Earth""'6 and the secular ambition of providing the world with a
model of democratic self-government."
During and after the Revolution, citizens of the newly independent
United States increasingly became of two minds on matters of law,
morality, and the prospect of divine national judgment. On the one hand,
widespread enthusiasm for using the law as a means of securing
compliance with divine commands diminished. Government leaders in

1o.

See

THOMAS

COLONIAL AMERICA

S.

KIDD, THE GREAT AWAKENING: THE RooTs OF EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY IN

-III (2007).

102. See id. at 68-69; see also id. at 95 (stating that, in Massachusetts, high grain prices and an
unstable currency were said to be God's attempts to awaken a spiritually slumbering people).
103. See id. at 76-77.
104. See REINHOLD NIEBUIHR & ALAN HEIMERT, A NATION SO CONCEIVED: REFLECTIONS ON THE
HISTORY OF AMERICA FROM ITS EARLY VISIONS TO ITS PRESENT POWER I6 (1963) (stating that the quest

for national unity in America "had its origin in the religious life of New England Puritanism, and more
particularly in the Great Awakening"). Jonathan Edwards marked the colonists' emerging national
bonds with his plea for all colonists to ask God to establish his kingdom in America. See id. at 16-17;
see also Jonathan Edwards, The Latter-Day Glory Is Probably To Begin in America (1746), reprinted
in GOD'S NEW ISRAEL, supra note 91, at 54 (predicting that God would establish his coming somewhere

in America, mostly likely in New England).
1o5.

ALAN HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM THE GREAT AWAKENING TO THE

REVOLUrION I4 (1966).
io6. IWILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN,
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at xx (1971).
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the late 17oos reduced the criminal law's reach on certain matters of
sexual morality, for example, choosing instead to focus on "the
preservation of order in society without reference to the saving of
souls."" 8 In the same spirit, a growing desire to promote a sense of
political unity gradually softened state and religious leaders to the
demands of those seeking the disestablishment of state religions."
At the same time, many continued to insist that there was a link
between the nation's conduct and the nation's treatment by God. Indeed,
that linkage had become a staple of American political and religious
rhetoric. Immediately prior to the Americans' decision to sever their ties
with England, for example, Benjamin Rush warned that God would
punish America for the evils of slavery,"0 a sentiment that President

Lincoln famously echoed nearly three-quarters of a century later."'
During the Revolutionary War, Thomas Paine told a British official that
"[t]here are such things as national sins" and that England stood in
danger of being punished by God for its wrongdoings."' A New
Hampshire minister preached in 1788 that Americans must learn the
lessons of ancient Israel: if you "adhere faithfully to the doctrines and
commands of the gospel, and practice every public and private virtue,"
he told his listeners, "you will increase in numbers, wealth, and
power[;] . . . whereas,

the contrary

conduct

will make

you poor,

distressed and contemptible."" 3 Such warnings continued to appear in
sermons throughout the nineteenth century."4

io8. Flaherty, supra note 96, at 248.
1o9. See KIDD, supra note rox, at 268, 293; see also I McLOUGHLIN, supra note lo6, at xxi (stating
that, between 1630 and 1830, "the duty to follow the Truth of God becomes the right to seek the Truth
wherever that search may lead; toleration of dissent becomes the right to believe anything or
nothing").
i1o. See Benjamin Rush, An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements on the Slavery
of the Negroes in America (1773), in i AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA
1760-1805, at 217, 230 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983) ('Remember that national
crimes require national punishments, and without declaring what punishment awaits this evil, you may
[be assured] that it cannot pass with impunity, unless God shall cease to be just or merciful.").
iii. See generally Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in GOD'S NEW
ISRAEL, supra note 91, at 201 (stating that the Civil War may have been God's punishment for the
national sin of slavery).
112. Letter from Thomas Paine to Lord Richard Howe (Jan. 13, 1777), in i THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS PAINE 179, 188-89 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., 1967).
113. Samuel Langdon, The Republic of the Israelites an Example to the American States (1788), in
GOD'S NEW ISRAEL, supra note 91, at 93, 98.
114. See, e.g., GEORGE DUFFIELD, A THANKSGIVING SERMON: THE RELIGIOUS CHARACTER OF A
PEOPLE THE TRUE ELEMENT OF THEIR PROSPERITY passim (1839) (preaching that God was threatening to
punish the nation for its national sins-ranging from slavery to dishonoring the Sabbath-by
dissolving the Union); ROSWELL D. HITCHCOCK, OUR NATIONAL SIN: A SERMON passim (1861)
(preaching that the Civil War was God's punishment for the nation's sins); WILLIAM INGRAHAM KIP,
OUR NATIONAL SINS: A SERMON 9 (1840) (preaching that individuals' sins may be punished in this life
or the next, but nations' sins must be punished in the present life because "[t]he tie which binds us
together as a nation is severed at the grave"); Dudley A. Tyng, Our Country's Troubles passim (June
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Today, warnings of geopolitical divine punishments are associated
primarily (although not exclusively) with evangelical Christianity."' After
a period of relative dormancy in the early twentieth century,"6
evangelicals gradually became more prominent in political affairs,
frequently warning of impending divine retribution for the nation's sins.
Evangelical preacher Billy Graham made national headlines in 1949, for
example, when he declared at a Los Angeles revival that communism
was a religion "inspired, directed, and motivated by the Devil himself"
and was "more rampant in Los Angeles than any other city in America,"
that God's judgment was "about to fall" on Los Angeles, and that the
only hope for the entire nation's continued survival "now lay in
repentance and revival."" 7 Fueled by that same anti-communist fervor
and by their adverse reaction to "aggressive efforts to secularize public
culture, of which the 1963 United States Supreme Court ruling against
Bible reading in public schools became the chief symbol," evangelicals
began to speak out on numerous social issues."' The stage was set for the
kinds of arguments that we frequently see and hear today: God will bring
harm upon the nation or its political subdivisions unless they conduct
themselves in particular ways."'
C.

THE DIVINE

ACCOUNTABILITY THESIS AND THE CONSTITUTION

When citizens propose a legislative agenda that is driven in whole or
in part by the divine accountability thesis, to what extent may
government officials adopt that agenda as their own? The Constitution
erects two primary hurdles, the first more formidable than the second.

1856), in N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1856, at 2 (preaching that slavery, nonparticipation in voting, and
undue loyalty to political parties are national sins, and that "as bodies politic have no existence in the
world to come, their judgment and recompense, unlike that of individuals, can take place only in this
world").
115. See supra notes I-6 and accompanying text (providing modern-day examples of such
29,

warnings); see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Evangelicals, Law, and Abortion, in FArH AND LAW: How

(Robert F. Cochran, Jr.
ed., 2oo8) ("Evangelicals have two central beliefs in common. First is the importance of a new birth in
Christ.... Second, evangelicals believe in the authority of scripture.").
1i6. See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE 208-09 (2oo6) (stating
that, despite their belief "that God judged whole nations," evangelicals in the early i9oos became
involved in only a small handful of public-policy domains, such as campaigns to prevent the teaching
of evolution in public schools).
RELIGIOUs TRADITIONS FROM CALVINISM TO ISLAM VIEw AMERICAN LAW 91, 93

117. MARTIN, supra note 93, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).

II8. MARSDEN, supra note 116, at 240-41; see also Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
(striking down a Pennsylvania law that required daily Bible readings in the public
schools).
119. See MARSDEN, supra note I1i6, at 247-48 (noting that warnings of the imminence of divine
judgment upon the United States have become commonplace).
212-27 (1963)
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The Establishment Clause and Its Foundations
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause does not permit state
or federal lawmakers to invoke the divine accountability thesis as a
primary rationale for government action." The Court has held that
government bodies must act in service to predominantly secular
objectives; the primary purpose underlying a governmental act cannot be
to "advance[] a particular religious belief"' 2 ' or "endorse a particular
religious doctrine." 22 "[A]t the very least," the Court has insisted, the
Establishment Clause "prohibits government from appearing to take a
position on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community."' 2 3 The Court has stressed that the government cannot
endorse religion in ways that send "a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community."'
Those principles clearly would be violated by a law that proscribed
certain kinds of conduct based on the conviction that the God of the
Judeo-Christian tradition would punish the geopolitical community if it
permitted that conduct to persist. By enacting such a law, legislators
would be taking a position on religious questions, endorsing a set of
religious doctrines, and sending a clear message to those of different
religious persuasions that, by virtue of their religious beliefs, they are
"outsiders" who do not fully belong to the community that the
government represents.
When viewed from the historical vantage point described in Parts L.A
and I.B, there is an unmistakable irony in the Supreme Court's
establishment jurisprudence. The perception that the Court wishes to
protect-the perception of membership in the American political
community-is the very same perception that drives those who embrace
the divine accountability thesis to seek legislation that runs counter to
Establishment Clause principles. From ancient Sumer to the United
States, the divine accountability thesis has emerged only after individuals
i.

izo. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. ... ").
121. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,585 (1987).
122. Id. at 594; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992) ("The design of the Constitution
is that preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice
committed to the private sphere. . . .").
123. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (989)
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see also Wallace v.
Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) ("[T~he Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes
adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community.").
124. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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have begun to forge communal bonds with one another. Invoking that
thesis can help to reinforce community boundaries, but it does not create
them; the divine accountability thesis is never applied to political
communities that people have not already begun to define for themselves.
It is precisely because individuals count themselves as members of the
American political community-the community that they believe will
either enjoy divine blessings or suffer divine punishment-that they feel
compelled to try to align the community's conduct with what they believe
God demands. In short, the good that the Court wishes to protect is one
of the causes of the evil that the Court wishes to avoid.
There is a second, paradoxical irony in the Court's establishment
framework: despite the Court's desire not to give citizens cause to
perceive that their religious beliefs render them political outsiders,
feelings of alienation from the political community are an inevitable
consequence of the Court's establishment rulings."' In seventeenthcentury Puritan settlements, it was religious skeptics and dissenters who
felt ostracized."' To a significant extent, the tables are now turned-those
who fear alienation today often include those who would like to enlist the
government's aid in executing what they believe to be God's agenda.'27
Putting the divine accountability thesis to work in one's political
arguments is thus both an expression of one's membership in the political
community and an attempt to shape that community's behavior in ways
that will prevent one's experience of communal membership from being
eclipsed by alienation.
Ironies, however, do not always signal errors. The ironies in the
Court's establishment jurisprudence are unavoidable consequences of
laudable constitutional objectives. A robust Establishment Clause is a
vital component of the nation's commitment to religious freedom and
tolerance. As Kathleen Sullivan observes, the Establishment Clause calls
a truce in interdenominational warfare by demanding that the nation's
"public moral disputes ... be resolved only on grounds articulable in
secular terms.""' If contested religious principles were permitted to
undergird legislative, executive, or judicial action, government institutions
would forfeit any hope of winning and keeping what John Rawls describes
in a related setting as "the support of an overlapping consensus"-the
support of those who subscribe to "opposing religious, philosophical and
125. See Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481, 516-18 (2004) (discussing what it
means to feel alienated from one's geopolitical community).
126. See i McLOUGHLIN, supra note xo6, at xviii ("The discontent of dissenters in colonial New
England sprang less from any civil disabilities they suffered under the ecclesiastical laws than from

feelings of social inferiority and ostracism.").
127. Cf Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 696-97 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that
mandating the removal of religious displays from government property sends a hostile message to
those who embrace the displays' religious significance).
128. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Cmn. L.REV. 195, 197-98 (1992).
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moral doctrines [that are] likely to thrive over generations in a more or
less just constitutional democracy."29
Those constitutional lines are not merely politically wise; they are
morally essential. As Thomas Nagel points out, there is an important
moral difference between the kinds of rationales that can justify an
individual's private beliefs and the kinds of rationales that can justify
government coercion.' A belief that a divine realm exists, that the divine
realm's desires and intentions have been revealed in one manner or
another, and that one must conform to the divine realm's demands, all
can provide a rational basis for an individual's own convictions and
behavior, but they do not constitute the kinds of reasons that can morally
justify governmental restrictions on a pluralistic citizenry's freedom. If
you wish to make the public case for government coercion ina given
setting, Nagel persuasively argues, you must be able
to present to others the basis of your own beliefs, so that once you have
done so, they have what you have, and can arrive at a judgment on the
same basis. That is not possible if part of the source of your conviction is
personal faith or revelation -because to report your faith or revelation
to someone else is not to give him what you have, as you do when you
show him your evidence or give him your arguments.'
If the government restricts citizens' freedom in an effort to serve some
constituents' religious goals, but those restrictions cannot be justified "in
objective terms, [then] it is a particularly serious violation of the Kantian
requirement that we treat humanity not merely as a means, but also as an
end."' Ronald Dworkin,'33 Richard Fallon,' 34 Kent Greenawalt,135 and
Stephen Macedo', 6 have reached comparable conclusions.
129. John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. i, I (1987)

(describing a desirable "political conception of justice").
130. See Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 215, 229

(1987).
131. Id. at 232.

132. Id. at 238. See generally Todd E. Pettys, The Immoral Application of Exclusionary Rules. 2008

Wis. L. REV. 463, 480-82 (discussing Immanuel Kant's "practical imperative" and its widespread
endorsement).
133. See Ronald Dworkin, Rawls and the Law, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1387. 1399 (2004) ("Judges

may not appeal to religious convictions or goals in liberal societies because such convictions cannot
figure in an overall comprehensive justification of the legal structure of a liberal and tolerant
pluralistic community.").
134. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Speakable Ethics and Constitutional Law: A Review Essay, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1523, 1549-50 (1989) (citing Nagel's argument with approval and stating that, if

government officials were permitted to justify their official actions with their private religious or moral
convictions, it would "trample on the right to equal respect of mature and competent persons who
could not reasonably be expected to acknowledge the justificatory force of the nonpublicly accessible
reasons").
135. See KENT GREENAwALT, RELIGIOUs CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 91 (1988) ("[A] liberal
that either cause no secular harm or
society should not rely on religious grounds to prohibit activities

do not cause enough secular harm to warrant their prohibition.').
136. See STEPHEN

MACEDO,
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Although the Establishment Clause draws lines that are politically
and morally desirable, the two ironies that I have described underscore
the inevitability of church-state conflicts in a society where the divine
accountability thesis enjoys a significant constituency. Those who
embrace that thesis will continue to value their membership in the
American political community and, as members of that community, will
continue to try to shape government policy in ways that they believe are
essential to win God's favorable treatment of the nation and its political
subdivisions. Given the centrality of the divine accountability thesis to
their worldview, those citizens will continue to foreground the religious
convictions underlying their political preferences. Constrained by the
Establishment Clause, elected officials will face the task of trying to
identify secular rationales for the government actions that their
religiously motivated constituents demand. Because judges are aware of
the religious convictions that drive those demands, legislators who try to
translate constituents' religious convictions into secular rationales will
find a cloud hovering over their efforts, all but inviting judges to dismiss
those secular rationales as mere pretexts. Court rulings that invalidate
those legislative efforts will, in turn, reinforce religiously motivated
citizens' belief that the threat of divine punishment looms larger with
each passing day.
We see that pattern repeatedly. In its 2oo9 ruling striking down
Iowa's ban on same-sex marriage, for example, the Iowa Supreme Court
rejected numerous efforts to justify the ban on secular grounds, then cut
to what it saw as the core of the issue-namely, "religious sentiment most
likely motivates many, if not most, opponents of same-sex civil
marriage."' The court insisted that the state's "constitution does not
permit any branch of government to resolve these types of religious
debates and entrusts to courts the task of ensuring government avoids
them."' 8 Efforts to identify secular rationales were deemed similarly
problematic in the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in Edwards v. Aguillard,
where the Court used the word "sham" to describe an effort to justify the
removal of evolution from public schools' science curricula on grounds of
academic freedom; 39 in Wallace v. Jaffree, where the Court found no
plausibility in the argument that Alabama had mandated a daily oneminute period of silence in the public schools merely as a religion-neutral

CONSTITUTIONALISM 44 (1990) (arguing that government coercion must be based upon "justifications
that are widely acceptable to reasonable people with a broad range of moral and philosophical
commitments and interests"); id. at 46-47 (arguing that "appeals to inner conviction or faith, special
insight, secret information, or very difficult forms of reasoning, are ruled out" because they do not
treat dissenters "as free and equal moral beings").
137. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 904 (Iowa 2009).
138. Id. at 905 (emphasis omitted).

339. 482 U.S. 578, 586-89 (1987).
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effort to accommodate students' religious practices; 40 and in Stone v.
Graham, where the Court stated that "no legislative recitation of a
supposed secular purpose can blind us to th[e] fact" that Kentucky's
primary purpose for posting a copy of the Ten Commandments in each
public-school classroom was "plainly religious in nature." 4 ' By applying
laudable anti-establishment principles in all of these cases, the Justices
gave many religiously motivated citizens cause to believe that, unless
dramatic constitutional changes are made, the United States soon will
suffer divine wrath.14 2
2. MajoritarianMorality as a Justificationfor Government Action
Recognizing the hurdles that the Establishment Clause places in
their path, where are citizens and lawmakers who embrace the divine
accountability thesis -but who need secular rationales for their
legislative agenda-likely to turn? The moral judgments of political
majorities have long been a leading candidate. The argument here is not
"We, a political majority, believe God demands X," but rather, "We, a
political majority, believe X is morally essential." So long as those moral
judgments can be defended on secular grounds, they might seem like a
perfect means of avoiding establishment difficulties. After all, there is a
strong correlation between what religiously motivated citizens believe
God demands and what those citizens believe is morally appropriate, yet
moral judgments cannot quickly be dismissed as mere religious
convictions dressed in secular clothing. 43 Might those who embrace the
divine accountability thesis be able to get as much legislative mileage out
of their moral judgments as they might have wanted to get out of their
religious convictions?
The prospects for morality-based arguments were brighter prior to
2003 than they are today. In its 2003 ruling in Lawrence v. Texas, striking
down Texas's criminal ban on homosexual sodomy, the Court erected a
second hurdle in the path of religiously motivated citizens by casting
140. 472 U.S. 38, 57 n.45 (1985).
141. 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam).
142. See, e.g., M.J. Cavallaro, Letter to the Editor, FORT COLLINS COLORADAN, Aug. 19, 2004, at 6A

("The nativity scene has been taken away, prayer in school is gone, our pledge of allegiance under
God is now in question, next will be In God We Trust. . . . How long will it be before the blessings will
be taken away? Don't think it will be ignored much longer."); Kip Speckels, People's Forum, Fox
Network Offers Sleazy Programming, GREEN BAY PREss-GAZETTE. May 23, 2002, at 6A ("How can
God bless a nation ... that, in the early 196os, took the Bible and prayer out of its schools and is now
offended by his Ten Commandments?"); Gary Bergel, Banning Prayer in Public Schools Has Led to
America's Demise, FORERUNNER, May 1998, http://forerunner.com/forerunner/Xoo98

Ban-on-school

prayer.html (arguing that God permitted numerous national problems to emerge or worsen following
Supreme Court rulings of the sort described above).
143. See Stanley Hauerwas, A Christian Critiqueof ChristianAmerica, in RELIGION, MORALITY, AND
THE LAW 110, I I8 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988) (stating that although "religion
and morality are conjoined" in the eyes of many Americans, it is not true "that morality must be
embodied in religion").
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doubt on the ability of majoritarian moral judgments, standing alone, to
justify criminal legislation.'" The Court acknowledged that
for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual
conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for
the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns
but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral
principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of
their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us,
however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the
State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of
the criminal law.145
The Court concluded that vindicating majoritarian moral judgments
could not justify Texas's "intrusion into the personal and private life of
the individual."4 6 "[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral," the Court wrote,
"is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."' 47
The Court suggested that Texas's statute could have survived
constitutional scrutiny only if it had been aimed at preventing "injury to
a person or abuse of an institution the law protects."148
Much has already been written about Lawrence, and there is no
need fully to immerse ourselves in that discussion here. For our
purposes, four brief points are important. First, if moral judgments are
indeed now out of play when legislators draft criminal codes, then
Lawrence greatly ratchets up the pressure on those who believe that
political communities must satisfy certain moral criteria in order to win
God's favorable treatment. Justice Scalia certainly thought the Lawrence
majority had indeed sweepingly declared moral judgments an insufficient
basis for criminal legislation. In a heated dissent, he complained that the
Court's ruling "effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation" and
that "criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest,
bestiality, and obscenity" now stood on perilous constitutional ground.' 49
If the courts hold to that line, we can expect those who subscribe to the
divine accountability thesis to push hard for the appointment of judges
who will provide them with a more accommodating interpretation of the
Constitution.
Second, we can expect some religiously motivated citizens to believe
that trying to articulate secular, nonmoral explanations for what they
believe God demands is uncomfortably akin to the biblical story of

144. See 539 U.S. 558, 577-79 (2003).
145. Id. at 571.

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.

at 578.
at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. i86, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
at 567.
dissenting).
at 599 (Scalia, J.,
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Adam and Eve's decision to eat the fruit of a tree that God had declared
off limits.' If God tells us not to eat a particular fruit, some citizens
might argue, then who are humans to second-guess God's reasons? Some
believers surely will fear that setting out on a quest to find secular,
nonmoral justifications for divine commands paves the way for the
conclusion that, when such rationales cannot be found, obeying those
commands is not terribly important after all. None of this will help
alleviate the tension between judges who are interpreting the nation's
constitutional traditions and citizens who believe the nation is edging
ever closer to cataclysmic divine retribution.
Third, Lawrence's holding with respect to the justificatory
sufficiency of moral judgments is actually less certain than Justice Scalia
suggested. Although some commentators believe Justice Scalia's reading
of the majority opinion was accurate,' 5' there certainly are other
reasonable interpretations. Flexibility might be found both with respect
to the kinds of moral judgments that are sufficient to undergird
legislation and with respect to the kinds of interests that morality-driven
legislation can infringe. With respect to the former, Cass Sunstein argues
that Lawrence permits lawmakers to base a criminal statute on
constituents' moral judgments, so long as the statute genuinely reflects
the citizenry's current moral commitments-the problem in Lawrence, he
argues, was that the Texas statute reflected an old-fashioned morality
that the people of Texas had largely abandoned.'52 With respect to the
interests that morality-driven legislation can infringe, one cannot help
but notice the Lawrence majority's choice of language and supporting
precedent. Although the Court did not expressly declare homosexual
sodomy a fundamental right meriting substantive due process's highest
measure of protection,' the Court claimed the support of precedent
involving fundamental rights'54 and described the right at issue in
language that ordinarily would suggest the Court had deemed
heightened protection appropriate.' Although morality was deemed an
150. See Genesis 3:1-24. In that story, the forbidden fruit is described both by "the serpent" and by
God as giving humans the capacity to discern good from evil. The story might thus be interpreted as
endorsing blind obedience to divine commands.
151. See, e.g., Keith Burgess-Jackson, Our Millian Constitution: The Supreme Court's Repudiation
of Immorality as a Ground of Criminal Punishment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 407, 415
(2004).
152. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27-30.
153. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (making this observation).
154. See id. at 564-66 (majority opinion) (citing cases involving contraception, abortion, and
parents' right to control the upbringing of their children).
'55. See id. at 567 ("when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice."); id. at 578
("The State cannot demean [homosexuals'] existence or control their destiny by making their private
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insufficient legislative rationale for infringing on gay and lesbian adults'
right to engage in consensual sexual intimacy, morality thus might be a
constitutionally sufficient legislative justification when a lesser interest
(such as the right to gamble or consume alcohol) is at stake."'
Finally, Lawrence's statements regarding the constitutional
adequacy of legislative moral judgments must be viewed in historical
context. The proper relationship between law and morality has been a
perennial subject of debate at least since the days of Aristotle,'57 a debate
typified in more recent times by the Hart-Devlin exchange in the i96os.5 8
Some have insisted that there are occasions when society is entitled to
embody its moral judgments in law; 5 9 others have insisted that there are
occasions when society's moral judgments cannot justify government
coercion.5'o Even if Lawrence's holding were clear, it would be naive to
assume that the Court's five-to-four ruling in that case was the Court's
and the Constitution's last word on the subject.

sexual conduct a crime.").
156. But cf Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After

Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2004) ("[S]ince the middle of the twentieth century,
the Court has never relied exclusively on an explicit morals-based justification in a majority opinion
that is still good law.").
157. See generally HARRY M. CLOR, PUBLIC MORALITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY: ESSAYS ON DECENCY,
LAW, AND PORNOGRAPHY 27 (1996) ("Far from maintaining that the moral life is no business of the
political community, Aristotelianism maintains that the formation of character is its primary
business.").
158. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13 (1965) ("[H]istory shows that the
loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of disintegration, so that society is justified in taking
the same steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its government and other essential
institutions."); H.L.A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 48-52 (1963) (criticizing Devlin's claim that

preserving English and American society requires that homosexuality be criminalized); id. at 46-47
(arguing that sparing some citizens from the knowledge that conduct is occurring which they regard as
immoral is an insufficient justification for criminalizing homosexual conduct).
159. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 309 (1999) (concluding that society
is entitled to ban conduct that it regards as immoral and damaging to a person's character and ability
to form solid relationships); Gregory Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S.
ConstitutionalLaw from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. I,30 (20o6)
("[I]ndividuals and groups need the help of the state acting through law in order to secure a social
milieu or public moral-cultural-educational environment in which they can pursue their own
flourishing.").
16o. See, e.g., JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION

165-66 (1960) ("It is not the function of the legislator to forbid everything that

the moral law forbids.. . . Law seeks to establish and maintain only that minimum of actualized
morality that is necessary for the healthy functioning of the social order."); MICHAEL J. PERRY,
MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 98-io (1988) (identifying reasons why citizens and legislators should be

cautious about trying to codify their moral convictions); Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., A Catholic Perspective
on Morality and the Law, IJ.L. & RELIGION 227, 239-4o (1983) (concluding that, unless "serious
violations of justice" are at stake, individuals must be left free to make and act upon their own moral

judgments).
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II. THE DIVINE ACCOUNTABILITY THESIS'S SECULAR COUNTERPART
For more than five thousand years, the divine accountability thesis' 6 '
has expressed a worldview that, in significant ways, subordinates a
political community's individual members to the political community
itself.I62 It asserts that a polity's well-being turns upon its collective
relationship with the divine realm, and that divine justice often focuses
broadly on entire cities, states, and nations, rather than narrowly on each
individual's moral merits. If one revisits the claims recounted in this
Article's opening paragraph, one finds no effort to distinguish between
the morally culpable and the morally innocent within a political
community that has been targeted for divine punishment. In the eyes of
the individuals who made those claims, it apparently is one's very
membership in a community stained by wrongdoing that makes one
deserving of hardship. Because everyone in the political community will
either justly suffer or justly flourish as a result of the conduct that the
community performs or permits, these individuals implicitly argue, it is
appropriate for decisions about many morality-laden matters to be made
by the community itself.
That worldview has a powerful competitor-a competitor with
which many who reject the divine accountability thesis likely associate
themselves. Political liberalism is grounded in the conviction that
individuals ordinarily must be left free to make their own moral decisions
and to enjoy any benefits and suffer any hardships that those decisions
bring their way. Yet even political liberalism is not the bastion of moral
neutrality that its proponents often claim it to be. We can easily find
within liberalism a desire to strip individuals of their freedom to make
certain morality-laden decisions for themselves, and to give that
decisionmaking power to the larger community instead. Of course, one
finds the same desire among subscribers to other schools of political
thought as well. 6 3 The fact that one finds that desire even in autonomychampioning liberalism, however, signals that something powerful is

driving that desire to the surface. The impulse to restrict individuals'
moral freedom flows directly from what I shall argue is the divine
accountability thesis's secular counterpart.

A.

COMMUNAL MORALITY WITHIN POLITICAL LIBERALISM

In his 1871 essay Democratic Vistas, Walt Whitman identified a
theme that he believed was central to American democracy: the theme of

161. See supra text accompanying note io (defining the divine accountability thesis).
162. See supra Part I.A B (describing variants of the divine accountability thesis in numerous
societies).
163. See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MIcH. L.
REv. 685, 688-95 (1992) (discussing three separate strains of communitarianism).
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individualism, centered upon an "image of completeness in separatism,
of individual personal dignity, of a single person, either male or female,
characterized in the main. . . in the pride of himself or herself alone."64
In Whitman's view, America's well-being depended upon free and
autonomous individuals joining together in democratic forms of
government to achieve their common objectives on the strength of their
own "inherent, normal, full-grown qualities, without any superstitious
support whatever." 6 5 A Whitmanesque commitment to individual
freedom and autonomy characterizes much of modern political
liberalism.
As a matter of political theory, liberalism today generally holds that
the state must remain neutral on questions of morality, leaving
individuals free to devise their own conceptions of what the good life
entails. 66 Following the lead of John Stuart Mill, liberalism places harm
at the center of its political morality: unless persons other than the actor
are at risk of getting hurt, the government has no business intervening.*,
On this view, the chief function of many of the individual rights that the
Constitution protects is to ensure that individuals remain free to define
moral goods for themselves.6 8 Liberalism also draws from Immanuel
Kant, holding that when the government
164. WALT WHITMAN, Democratic Vistas, in COMPLETE POETRY AND COLLECTED PROSE 929, 942

(Justin Kaplan ed., 1982).

165. Id.; see also RoRTY, supra note io, at 16 ("[Whitman] wanted Americans to take pride in what
America might, all by itself and by its own lights, make of itself, rather than in America's obedience to
any authority-even the authority of God.").
166. See GREENAWALT, supra note 135, at 21 ("Liberalism is often associated with a rejection of
corporate authority in favor of individual autonomy...."); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S

(1996) ("By the 1970s, the version of
liberalism that asserts the priority of the right over the good had become reigning American public
philosophy. The notion that government should be neutral among competing conceptions of the good
life in order to respect people's rights to choose their own values and ends figured prominently in
political discourse and constitutional law.").
DISCONwrNr: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 294

167. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 73-74 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g CO. 1978)

(1859) ("[W]hen a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, . .. there should
be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences."); see also I JOEL
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING, at ix (1988) (endorsing
liberalism's rejection of "legal moralism"-the view that the law may be used to "prevent inherently
immoral conduct whether or not such conduct is harmful or offensive to anyone"); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 413 (1986) (stating that Mill's harm principle is usually invoked as an argument

for "restrain[ing] both individuals and the state from coercing people to refrain from certain activities
or to undertake others on the ground that those activities are morally either repugnant or desirable").
Many believe the Court endorsed the Millian harm principle in Lawrence v. Texas. See supra notes
144-48 and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence); see also Christian J. Grostic, Note, Evolving
Objective Standards: A Developmental Approach to Constitutional Review of Morals Legislation, 1o5
MICH. L. REV. I5, 152 (2006) (stating that most readers of Lawrence have concluded that the Court

now follows Mill's harm principle, under which moral justifications for laws must be accompanied by
threatened harms).
x68. Cf Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianismand Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 444 (2000)
(discussing liberalism's definition of "rights prior to, and independently of, the good").
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forces someone to serve an end whose status as an end she can
reasonably decline to acknowledge-to do the purported will of a god
in whom she does not believe, for example-it is [immorally] treating
her as a mere means in the pursuit of others' purposes, and not as an
end in herself."
When framed at the level of overarching theories, liberalism and the
divine accountability thesis appear starkly opposed to one another.
Liberalism demands that individuals remain free to shape their own
moral lives and that government officials intervene only when an
individual's conduct poses a risk of harm to others; advocates of the
divine accountability thesis demand that government officials help
ensure that all individuals within a geopolitical community conduct
themselves in the way that those advocates believe the divine realm
demands. When one presses beneath the surface, however, one finds that
advocates of political liberalism are much more deeply engaged in
communal decisionmaking on moral matters than their rhetoric of
governmental neutrality would suggest. In very real ways, advocates of
political liberalism and advocates of the divine accountability thesis are
joint participants in the same moralistic enterprise.
At two different levels, political liberalism's champions make moral
claims about the kinds of lives that the government should permit or
encourage its citizens to lead. First, liberalism's commitment to
individual autonomy is itself morally significant. As communitarian
scholars have pointed out, "even the liberal state constructs and
promotes a particular moral framework, namely, one that places
individual freedom and autonomy at the top of society's normative
hierarchy."' 70 Liberalism makes a first-order moral judgment, in other
words, when it concludes that, in the absence of harm, government
interference with individual autonomy cannot be justified. 7' In fact,
absolute moral neutrality with respect to any given form of conduct is
impossible: whether the government promotes individual autonomy by
permitting that conduct to occur or strips individuals of their freedom to
decide whether that conduct is appropriate, government cannot help but
make a moral choice.
169. Fallon, supra note 134, at 1549-50; see also IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 54 (Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1969) (1785) ("Act so that
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a
means only."); Pettys, supra note 132, at 480-82 (discussing Kant's "practical imperative" and its
widespread endorsement).
170. Ball, supra note 168, at 445 & n.9 (attributing the quoted thesis to the communitarian scholars
whose work Ball critiques); see also Nagel, supra note 130. at 217 (observing that, with their demands
for governmental neutrality on moral matters, liberals open themselves to the charge "that all the
pleas for toleration and restraint really disguise a campaign to put the state behind a secular,
individualistic, and libertine morality-against religion and in favor of sex, roughly").
171. See RAz, supra note 167, at 415 (stating that "regard[ing] personal autonomy as an essential
ingredient of the good life" is a moral judgment).
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Second, those who subscribe to political liberalism must, by
necessity, make second-order, case-by-case moral judgments about
whether government intervention is appropriate. As Joseph Raz
explains, the elastic concept of harm that political liberalism places at the
center of its political and moral calculus is inescapably infused with
moral concerns: whether one believes something should count as
politically remediable harm depends entirely on one's moral
perspective."' It is our moral perspective that tells us in specific cases
whether the risks of bodily injury, damage to physical property, harm to
reputation, inconvenience to neighbors, feelings of disgust provoked in
onlookers, and other consequences of the disputed conduct are harms
warranting governmental interference with individuals' ability to live
their lives as they see fit.
Not only are all assessments of harm morally laden, there even are
instances when many advocates of liberalism likely would regard offense
to their own moral sensibilities as a legislatively cognizable injury." 3
Consider, for example, the crimes of consensual bigamy among adults'74
and consensual incest between a parent and his or her adult biological
child." Regardless of their religious commitments, many (though
admittedly not all) liberalism-endorsing Americans undoubtedly favor
laws proscribing those practices. Yet what, precisely, are the harms in
those cases that warrant public moral judgments? One thing seems
certain: for many of us, an instinctive moral condemnation precedes any
clear, empirically grounded understanding of the injuries that those
practices inflict. To be sure, we could posit such harms-perhaps harm to
children who are raised in bigamous households or are conceived in
incestuous relationships. Yet suppose we devised means by which those
posited harms could be avoided-suppose we declared that the only
persons who may enter bigamous marriages or have incestuous sexual
relations are those who do not have children and are unable to bear
them. Would advocates of liberalism then withdraw their objections to
those practices? Some would, but others would not. Some would find it
morally intolerable if their political community permitted such conduct
to occur-more intolerable than if the conduct were occurring in some

172. See id. at 414.

173. Cf MACEDO, supra note 136, at 209 ("Liberals need not be rights absolutists; most would

permit, for example, certain minimal forms of political paternalism.").
174. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH,

A GUIDE To AMERICA'S SEX

LAWS 143 (1996) ("Most states do not distinguish between the concepts of bigamy and polygamy,
punishing all plural marriages as bigamy... . In the vast majority of states, bigamy is a felony carrying

a substantial maximum prison sentence.").
'75. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, io CARDOZo WOMEN'S L.J. 337, 349 (2004)
("All but three states criminalize some forms of consensual adult incest. Every state that does so
criminalizes at least incest between parents and their children.").
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other part of the world' 6 -and they would not believe any further
justification for government intervention was needed.
Why is that the case? Why is it that many who reject the divine
accountability thesis and who celebrate liberalism's commitment to
individual autonomy nevertheless find occasions when they wish to
express moral condemnation through their government's civil and
criminal codes? Are these necessarily instances of hypocrisy, or might
there sometimes be a deeper, potentially more satisfying explanation?
And why is it that offense to one's moral sensibilities is often more
intolerable when the offensive conduct is occurring within one's own
political community than when it is occurring somewhere else? The
answers to those questions lie in the divine accountability thesis's secular
counterpart.

B.

THESIS
The secular counterpart to the divine accountability thesis consists
of two overlapping and widely held perceptions: (i) our individual
identities are integrated with, and partially constructed by, the political
communities to which we belong; and (2) each of our political
communities is akin to a personified moral agent whose conduct
reverberates in the individual lives of its integrated members. I shall call
these two perceptions, taken together, the "integration thesis.""' In all
cases in which these perceptions are in play, the experience of
membership in a political community can prompt even the most secularminded individuals to ask government leaders to make and enforce
moral judgments regarding the conduct that occurs within that
community, just as the same experience of community membership
prompts some to seek the same ends by invoking the divine
accountability thesis.
With respect to the first perception composing the integration
thesis, our individual identities unquestionably are partially bound up
with the political communities to which we belong. Our immersion in
political communities helps make us who we are."' Joel Feinberg writes
that an individual "is essentially a social product"-he "is born into a
family . . . and a larger political community, . .. his membership and
THE INTEGRATION

176. See CLOR, supra note 157, at 90 (observing that we might feel outraged when we hear about
terrible acts committed in other parts of the world, "but not a sustained outrage and sense of
responsibility to do something about it; those countries are not ours").
177. This footnote serves merely to facilitate internal cross-references.
178. See Gardbaum, supra note 163, at 704 ("The social constitution of identity means ... that, had
we been brought up in a different society from the one we were in fact brought up in, we would now
be different people in certain essential respects."); see also id. at 692 (acknowledging the claim made
by some communitarians "that the community of which an individual is a member is constitutive of
that individual's identity and not merely contingent or accidental to it").
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sense of belonging imprinted from the start."' Michael Sandel observes
that "the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those
communities from which I derive my identity-whether family or city,
tribe or nation, party or cause.,,io Kenneth Karst notes that "membership
in the national community helps to provide a sense of wholeness, not
only for the society but also for the citizen's sense of self."' 8 ' All of these
realities are captured in a declaration that most citizens of the United
States would fully embrace: "I am an American.'
The second perception composing the integration thesis extends the
first perception's significance in important ways. We have a striking
tendency to personify the political communities to which we belong, to
see ourselves as constituent parts of those personified communities, and
to experience changes in our sense of well-being based on the conduct in
which those personified communities engage. Of course, we do not
ascribe actual metaphysical existence to political communities-we do
not say that a political community is an actual super-sized person with its
own thoughts and intentions.'"' Yet we do regularly conceive of our
political communities as person-like moral agents. Because our
individual identities are integrated with those communal moral agents,
we experience greater or lesser measures of well-being based on those
agents' conduct.
Ronald Dworkin and Paul Kahn have made this point well. Why is it
that "we feel responsible for public actions against which we may have
voted or, even more dramatically, for public actions that preceded our
own membership in the state"?" Why do we "see national history as an
expression of our own identity-think of the 'founding fathers'-

179. I FEINBERG, supra note 167, at 83; see also id. at 86-87 (stating that community allegiances
form important parts of our individual identities).
18o. Michael J. Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS I, 6 (Michael J. Sandel ed.,
1984)181. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 184

(1989).
182. Cf ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN

AMERICAN LIFE 250 (1996) (finding in interviews with numerous Americans "a widespread and strong
identification with the United States as a national community").
183. Cf I FEINBERG, supra note 167, at 85 (arguing that it is a mistake to suppose that political
communities are "some sort of super-individuals with minds and bodies of their own, and rights and
duties not reducible to those of any constituent officials, representatives, or other ordinary sorts of
individuals"). In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, however, such claims found greater
traction. See, e.g., SHAILER MATHEWS, PATRIOTISM AND RELIGION 4 (i198) ("We have come to see that

our nation is more than a group of people existing under one government within definite
boundaries.... It is a glorious super-person, possessed of virtues, power, ideals, daring and sacrifice.");
see also Todd E. Pettys, Our Anti-Competitive Patriotism, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1353, 8380-8 &
nnf.1o7-o9 (2006) (discussing this view and its origins in the controversial political philosophy of
G.W.F. Hegel).
184. Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. i,78 (8989).-
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regardless of any actual, empirical connection to that history"?' Why do
Germans who were not alive during World War II experience feelings of
shame arising from Germany's treatment of the Jews?'" Why do
modern-day Americans feel morally implicated in the United States's
past dealings with slavery?' The answers to these questions, Dworkin
and Kahn suggest, flow from two facts: we conceive of our national
political community as "a single distinct moral agent,"'" and, because we
are integrated components of that moral agent, "the success or failure of
[our political] community's communal life is eart of what determines
whether [our individual] lives are good or bad."'
Dworkin borrows an analogy from John Rawls that helps to clarify
the argument:
A healthy orchestra is itself a unit of agency. The various musicians
who compose it are exhilarated, in the way personal triumph
exhilarates, not by the quality or brilliance of their individual
contributions, but by the performance of the orchestra as a whole. It is
the orchestra that succeeds or fails, and the success or failure of that
community is the success or failure of each of its members.'"
In much the same way, Dworkin argues, the "formal political acts" of a
government's legislative, executive, and judicial branches affect the wellbeing of the individuals whose identities are embedded in that political
community."' "An integrated citizen," Dworkin writes, "will count his
community's success or failure ... as resonating in his own life, as
improving or diminishing it."'" Just as a musician who individually plays
well during an otherwise disastrous orchestral performance will regard
his or her evening as a frustrating disappointment, an integrated citizen
will regard the quality of his own life as reduced, Dworkin contends, "if
he lives in an unjust community, no matter how hard he has tried to
make it just." 93
Notice that, on Dworkin's view, it is only the "formal political acts"
of government that resonate in integrated citizens' lives, and not the acts

185. Id.
186. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 172 (1986).
187. See id.
188. Id. at 187. It is on the strength of this insight that Dworkin builds his well-known argument
that law demands "integrity": "the state [must] act on a single, coherent set of principles" as if the state
were indeed "a moral agent." Id. at 166.
189. Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REv. 479, 492 (1989); see also Kahn, supra
note 184, at 72 ("We hold ourselves responsible, and are held responsible, for the actions of the state,
even when there is little we can do, or could have done, about them.").
190. Dworkin, supra note 189, at 493 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 520-29 (1971)).
191. Idat 496.
192. Id. at 500; see also id. at 496 ("The formal political acts of a political community-the acts of
its government through its legislative, executive, and judicial institutions-meet all the conditions of
collective agency we identified when we considered why an orchestra has a communal life.").
193. Id. at Sox.
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of fellow citizens behaving in their private capacities. By limiting the
causes of communal integration's effects to a government's formal
legislative, executive, and judicial acts, Dworkin hopes to protect
political liberalism from an argument that has the potential to leave
liberalism in tatters. Opponents of political liberalism argue that the
commission of immoral acts by individuals within a political community
can affect the well-being of all of that community's integrated members,
and that government institutions thus ought to be permitted to punish
those who engage in the morally objectionable conduct.' 94 If that
argument has merit, then liberalism's plea for tolerance and for broad
respect for individual autonomy is at risk of being devoured by
integration's effects: integration becomes the basis for restricting
individuals' moral autonomy in a host of areas. Taking pre-Lawrence
laws criminalizing homosexual sodomy as an example, Dworkin responds
by insisting that, when allegedly immoral acts are committed by
individuals, rather than by the government as a single moral agent, then
any moral discomfort that others feel is not a legislatively cognizable
consequence of communal integration. He argues that it is only formal
governmental acts that "[o]ur practices identify. . . as acts of a distinct
legal person[,] rather than [acts] of some collection of individual
citizens," that affect integrated citizens' well-being.'95 Dworkin points to
the prosecution of wars and the imposition of taxes as examples-these
are acts in which a geopolitical community behaves as a single agent, and
so, for better or worse, they reverberate in the lives of the community's
integrated members.96 In contrast, Dworkin contends, we do not have a
national sex life; in its capacity as a moral agent, our national community
does not engage in sexual practices that affect the well-being of its
citizens.'" Sexually conservative individuals thus are not "defiled by the
sexual practices of" more sexually adventurous citizens within that same
geopolitical community, and so they cannot cite their integration with
that community as a basis for securing legislation that would declare
those practices a crime.
Some might believe, with Dworkin, that when determining whether
communal integration gives citizens cause to seek legislation on a given
matter, we ought indeed to distinguish between those areas in which the
national community acts as a single moral agent and those in which the

194. See, e.g., DEVLIN, supra note 158, at 13 ("[Tjhe loosening of moral bonds is often the first
stage of disintegration, so that society is justified in taking the same steps to preserve its moral code as
it does to preserve its government and other essential institutions."); see also Dworkin, supra note 189,
at 491 (acknowledging this argument).
195. Dworkin, supra note 589, at 496.
196. See id.
'97. See id. atg497598. See id.
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community's members act on their own. Yet Dworkin's distinction does
not accurately capture the way in which many Americans actually
experience their communal integration, nor is it clear that Dworkin's
argument provides the normative ammunition needed to persuade those
citizens that they ought to feel otherwise.
Although it is the descriptive weakness of Dworkin's distinction that
is most relevant for our purposes here, let us first briefly consider that
distinction's normative difficulties. If, as Dworkin argues, the acts of a
government's legislative and judicial branches are among the "formal
political acts" that resonate in the lives of a community's integrated
members,' then the practical distinction between the formal acts of
government and the private acts of citizens can rather quickly break
down. Return for a moment to the example of consensual incest between
a parent and his or her adult biological child. 0 Suppose that such acts of
incest were known to occur within a particular political community. On
Dworkin's argument, we would not yet have a collective act that affects
integrated citizens' well-being in ways warranting a legislative response.
Yet suppose that morally outraged citizens nevertheless succeeded in
securing a criminal ban on consensual adult incest (perhaps based on
concerns regarding the health of those individuals' offspring). The
enactment of that legislation would certainly be a formal governmental
act that resonated in integrated citizens' lives, favorably for some and
unfavorably for others. Further suppose that a court then ruled that the
ban unconstitutionally infringed on adults' right to engage in consensual
sexual intimacy. That ruling would be a second formal governmental act
that would reverberate in integrated citizens' lives, again favorably for
some and unfavorably for others. Even on Dworkin's model, citizens
who were unhappy with the ruling thus would perceive an integrationdriven reason to lobby for the very governmental action that Dworkin
wishes to preclude. Some conservatives surely would describe their
reaction to the Court's ruling in Lawrence in precisely this way. 20 '
One might respond by arguing that opponents of adult incest never
had an integration-driven reason to demand the initial legislative ban,
and that they cannot bootstrap their way into an integration-driven
argument by inappropriately provoking their legislatures or courts to
speak as a single moral agent. Yet here we find that Dworkin's line fails
conclusively to resolve the question of what actually is and is not
appropriate for citizens to demand of their government in the first place.
As Bernard Williams asks, why must we accept a priori that the line
separating collective and individual acts marks the line separating those

199. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
2oo. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes i44-6o and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence).
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instances in which integration's consequences should and should not be
deemed sufficient grounds for political action?2 2 Why is it, for example,
that changes in the nation's culture-changes that reverberate in the lives
of those whose identity is partially embedded in that culture -should not
be deemed to produce the kinds of integration effects that can justify a
response from the government in which that culture is situated?2 0 3 In the
end, Dworkin fails to draw a line that liberals and nonliberals alike are
obliged to endorse.
For purposes of understanding the work performed by the
integration thesis in American politics, what matters most is recognizing
that the individual effects of communal integration are, in large measure,
a matter of perception. Regardless of what our normative theories
suggest they ought to perceive, citizens frequently do perceive that, by
virtue of their integration with a political community, their individual
well-being is affected by the presence or absence of certain kinds of
conduct within those geopolitical borders. When citizens demand that
government respond by reshaping the conduct that those political
communities permit, they enter the same territory that advocates of the
divine accountability thesis have been entering for thousands of years.
Of course, coming to a richer understanding of the religious and
secular reasons that drive people to behave as they do is valuable only if
that understanding is a prelude to critical reflection. We ultimately must
try to assess when collective political action that restricts individuals'
moral autonomy is most defensible. It is to that difficult task that we now
turn.
Ill. GUIDEPOSTS FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

MORALITY

My aim in Parts I and II was to examine some of the core beliefs and
perceptions that drive individuals to want to shift decisionmaking
responsibility-on numerous matters of moral concern-from individuals
to their governments. Because those beliefs and perceptions relate
directly or indirectly to many matters on which the citizenry is sharply
divided, facilitating constructive dialogue on these issues is admittedly a
tall order. Yet our system of democratic constitutionalism presupposes
that members of the sovereign citizenry will constructively engage one
another in the areas of their deepest conflicts, searching for ways in
which bridges might be built and fundamental commitments might be

2o2.

See Bernard Williams, Dworkin on Community and Critical Interests, 77

518-20 (1989) (arguing that we need not accept Dworkin's argument a priori).
203. Cf Philip Selznick, Dworkin's Unfinished Task, 77 CAL. L.REV. 505, 506

CAL.

L. REV. 5,

(3989) (criticizing
Dworkin's argument on the grounds that "the norms that govern our sex lives are collective, as are the
institutions within which regulated sex life occurs").

12oo0

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6m:1161

adjusted, 20 4 even while understanding that many of our disagreements are
unlikely ever to be fully resolved.2 5 I try to point the way toward such
bridges and adjustments here in Part III.
I first dispel what might otherwise be a dialogue-stifling
misunderstanding: One might mistakenly assume that advocates of the
divine accountability thesis21 believe the government ought to throw its

weight behind all of the divine realm's expectations. To the contrary,
most advocates of that thesis are engaged in the same line-drawing
enterprise that occupies everyone else who delves into the relationship
between law and morality. No matter what their religious perspective,
nearly everyone is working to distinguish between those public matters
on which government action is appropriate and those private matters
that must be reserved for each individual's own moral judgment. Hoping
to draw advocates of the divine accountability thesis and the integration
thesis2 0' at least partially onto common ground, I then propose seven
questions that ought to be addressed by anyone who is contemplating
whether a given moral issue should be deemed a matter of public or
private concern.
A.

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES' EMBRACE OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE
DISTINCTION

In the secular realm, it is clear that we are continually engaged in an
effort to distinguish between those public areas of moral concern where
government coercion is appropriate and those private areas where
individuals ought to be free to live their lives as they see fit." That task
can be extraordinarily difficult at times, in large part because each of us
as individuals is neither wholly integrated nor wholly autonomous.20 Our
individual identities are partially bound up with the political
communities to which we belong,2 0 yet we cherish our capacity to reflect
critically on those communities and to demand that vast swaths of
decisionmaking power remain in our own individual hands.2 I' Constantly

204. Cf Michael J. Perry, Moral Knowledge, Moral Reasoning, Moral Relativism: A "Naturalist'
Perspective, 2o GA. L. REV. 995, 1072-73 (1986) (arguing that we should not assume there are inherent

limits on the ability of people with different moral perspectives to reason with one another).
205. Cf Fallon, supra note 134, at 1558 ("[R]eligious disagreements will seldom be reconcilable

through arguments that rest on publicly accessible reasons, and we cannot reasonably ask those whose
beliefs are rejected to acknowledge the justificatory force of reasons of other kinds.").
206. See supra text accompanying note To (defining the divine accountability thesis).
207. See supra text accompanying note 177 (defining the integration thesis).
208. See supra notes T66-68 and accompanying text (discussing liberalism's focus on harm).
209. See Selznick, supra note 203, at 507-08 (observing that, because political communities are not
homogenous, citizens experience continual tension between autonomy and integration).
210. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
211. See MACEDo, supra note 536, at 246-50 (making this observation).
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pulled between those two dimensions of our identities, we debate how
the public-private line ought to be drawn.
Contrary to what one might assume, most participants in the
nation's religious traditions are engaged in precisely the same linedrawing task. There admittedly are some who, like the Puritans of the
seventeenth century,212 resist making any distinction between public and
private morality and insist that the government ought to help ensure that
all people obey all of the divine realm's commands. Catholic theologian
John Murray complained half a century ago, for example, that some of
his Protestant counterparts seemed unwilling to distinguish between
public and private morality.21 3 Yet in most mainstream religious circles
today, we find an eagerness to try to make that very distinction.
The Ten Commandments provide several examples." A few of
those directives-such as the commandments against murder2 5 and
stealing2")-concern matters on which religious and secular citizens alike
are eager for the government to speak. Yet several commandments
concern behaviors that most Jews and Christians appear to regard as
private matters in which the government has little or no role to play.
These ancient religious texts declare, for example, that people may
neither make nor worship idols"'-practices that are protected from
governmental interference under the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause,"' to the apparent satisfaction of the mainstream Judeo-Christian
community. Other commandments demand that children honor their
parents2 " and that no person covet his or her neighbor's spouse or
possessions22o-matters for which we find no religion-fueled lobbying
campaigns. Another commandment prohibits doing any work on the
seventh day of the week 22'-a directive once widely enforced within the

212.

See supra notes 91-loo and accompanying text.

See MriuY, supra note 16o, at 158. This unwillingness is not unique to Protestants. Catholic
scholar Charles Lugosi argues, for example, that the Ten Commandments "create absolute standards
of right and wrong," that "[t]o adopt a posture of assumed 'neutrality' [on the values expressed in the
Ten Commandments] is in essence hostility toward God and the rule of law," and that if Americans do
not honor the Ten Commandments, the nation will "be cursed with disasters of biblical proportions."
213.

Charles I. Lugosi, How Secular Ideology Is Marginalizingthe Rule of Law and Catholic Contributions
to Law and Society II: The Ten Commandments and the Rejection of Divine Law in American
Jurisprudence,47 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. '45, 145-46, 148, 151 (2oo8).
214. See generally Exodus 2o:1-17.
215. See id. at 20:13.
216. See id. at 20:15.
217. See id. at 20:4-5.
218. See U.S. CONsT.

religion].

amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise [of

.. )

219. See Exodus 20:12.
220. See id. at 20:17.
221. See id. at 20:8-I I.
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Anglo-American legal tradition,"2 but now regarded by many Jews and
Christians as a matter of private responsibility. 2 3
Far from demanding that government enforce all of the divine
realm's commands, numerous religious traditions appear to regard
obedience to some of those directives as a desirable means of setting
themselves off from the larger culture in which they live. Honoring the
Sabbath serves that function for Orthodox Jews, for example, as does
avoiding meat during Lent for Catholics and avoiding alcohol and
tobacco for Mormons. On these and other matters, religious communities
forego dependence upon secular governments and embrace these
opportunities to rely entirely upon the force of their own faith to secure
compliance with what they believe are the divine realm's expectations.
Regardless of their religious perspective, therefore, nearly everyone
who takes an interest in matters of law and morality is ultimately
engaged in the same task-they are trying to discern when it is and is not
appropriate to enlist the government's aid in procuring the conduct that
one believes is morally appropriate.
B.

SEVEN QUESTIONS

With respect to the task of demarcating the realms of public and
private morality, the prospects for facilitating dialogue within our highly
pluralistic society will be greatly improved if we at least can agree upon
some of the central factors that ought to influence our deliberations. I
propose several such factors here. I do not purport to provide an
overarching political or moral theory that definitively tells us when the
morality of a given form of conduct ought to be left for individuals to
determine on their own. Given our pluralism, it would be nalve to
suppose that any such theory could win the support of most reasonable
Americans. 224 Rather, I aim to provide a vocabulary and framework for
dialogue between scholars and citizens of diverse perspectives.
There are at least seven questions that everyone-regardless of their
religious or ideological worldview-ought to ask when trying to draw
lines between public and private morality. I attempt to frame each of

222. See Lesley Lawrence-Hammer, Note, Red, White, but Mostly Blue: The Validity of Modern
Sunday Closing Laws Under the Establishment Clause, 6o VAND. L. REv. 1273, 1275-78 (2oo7) (briefly
reviewing the history of "blue laws"). These laws enjoy the blessing of the U.S. Supreme Court. See
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-53 (1961) (rejecting attacks leveled under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses).
223. See Lawrence-Hammer, supra note 222, at 1278-82 (describing numerous ways in which "blue
laws" have been softened, to the point where many regard them as "little more than irrelevant relics
from America's Puritan past").
224. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 58 (1999)
("Philosophers are never so provincial as when they are placing beyond the pale of the 'reasonable'
the moral claims of people who do not belong to their narrow community.").
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these questions in a manner that advocates of the divine accountability
thesis, advocates of the integration thesis, and advocates of other points
of view all can embrace without being unfaithful to their core beliefs and
political perceptions. I do not ask individuals to set aside their belief that
God sometimes interacts with humanity along geopolitical boundaries,
for example, nor do I ask them to ignore their perception that political
communities' conduct affects the well-being of those communities'
integrated members. No single one of these seven queries is necessarily
dispositive, but each is relevant to the task.
i. Does the Conduct at Issue Pose a Risk of Harm to Others? If So,
Is the Harm Trivial or Weighty?
These questions relate, of course, to the Millian principle of harm
that I have already briefly addressed,2 2 5 and so-despite their widely
perceived importance-there is little need to discuss them in detail here.
Although the concept of harm lacks precise contours,"

the Anglo-

American tradition has long regarded the question of harm to others as
centrally relevant to the task of determining whether a given form of
conduct ought to be criminally punished. 2 7 That tradition reflects our
intuition that, in a society that is fundamentally committed to equality, it
makes little sense to protect one person's freedom to pursue his or her
own conception of the good life when that protection comes at the cost of
undermining other individuals' capacity to do the same thing.
A tacit acknowledgement of harm's relevance might explain some
religious communities' distinction between those divine directives for
which the government's backing is sought and those for which it is not.
Jews and Christians do not ask their government leaders to help enforce
some of the directives one finds in the Ten Commandments, for example,
such as the directives against making and worshipping idols and coveting
others' possessions. 22 Might this reflect a recognition that, absent some
discernable risk of harm that an actor's conduct poses to others, the
argument for governmental regulation can be exceptionally difficult to

make? 229

225. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing political liberalism's reliance on Mill).
226. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text (noting the elasticity of the concept of harm).
227. See Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1152-59 (describing the powerful influence of the no-harm principle). Far

more controversial is the question of whether governments ought to protect actors from harming
themselves. Although many will regard the risk of self-inflicted harm as relevant to the moral
propriety of government intervention, it is not a factor likely to receive the consensus support that I
am seeking here.
228. See supra notes 214-23 and accompanying text (discussing the Ten Commandments).
229. As I have indicated, however, the concept of harm is so elastic-possibly even encompassing
offense to others' moral sensibilities (as in my examples of bigamy and consensual adult incest), see
supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text-that it is difficult to regard the harm inquiry as necessarily
dispositive.
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Can the Harm Posed to Others Be Described in Nonreligious
Terms?
I indicated earlier that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence rests in part on the sound moral premise that government
restrictions on individuals' freedoms must be justified by reasons that can
be objectively explained and fully grasped without the aid of religious
faith or divine revelation.2 30 With Nagel, I argued that if the government
were permitted to regulate on the strength of principles embraced by
some constituents solely as a matter of religious conviction, the
government would violate nonbelievers' moral right to be treated equally
as ends, rather than merely as means by which other constituents'
religious goals could be achieved. As Amy Gutman and Dennis
Thompson put it, "[d]eliberative democracy asks citizens and officials to
justify public policy by giving reasons that can be accepted by those who
are bound by it." 23 ' In nontheocratic democracies such as ours,
government bodies must not dispositively rest their actions upon reasons
that gain force only when one embraces principles of religious faith that
cannot be established by ordinary methods of proof.232 When describing
the rationale for stripping individuals of their moral autonomy on a given
matter, therefore, it is essential that one be able to frame any harm-based
argument in nonreligious terms.
I noted earlier that some religious citizens might resist the morally
appropriate demand that they try to identify secular rationales for what
they believe to be God's commands.2 33 That resistance might be softened
if we openly acknowledged that religion does have an important role to
play in these debates. Given the fact that many Americans' moral values
"are deeply rooted in religion," it would be foolish to suppose that
religious values either could or should be entirely eliminated from
democratic discourse.2 34 Religious convictions may play especially
important roles in the early stages of public dialogue, prompting us to
pose hypotheses to be tested, for example, and impelling us to take great
care when examining data that conflicts with our deeply held convictions.
In the end, however, the government's actions must rest upon
justifications that can be explained in secular terms and that any rational
2.

230. See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
231. AMY GUTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 52 (1996).

232. See id. at 56-57 (advancing this argument); see also Fallon, supra note 134, at 1549 ("[T]he
stance of objectivity leads to a demand that state coercion be justified by reasons that would at least
have the status of reasons before the tribunal of every (or virtually every) mature person's
understanding.").
233. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
234. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
21 (1984); see also GREENAWALI, supra note 135, at 44 (noting how extraordinarily difficult it would be

for a religious person to try to remove all traces "of his own religious convictions in his political life").
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person-regardless of his or her religious beliefs-could embrace. 35
Evangelical scholar Robert Cochran goes a long way toward making this
very point when he tells his readers that "[o]ur arguments should be
framed primarily in moral terms that are accessible to all" and that "i]f a
law is to have broad support, it must be based on common grounds." 2 3
3. Does the Conduct at Issue Significantly Detractfrom My Ability
To Remain an IntegratedMember of This Political Community?
Conversely, Would Proscribingthe Conduct at Issue
Significantly Detractfrom the Ability of Others To Remain
Integrated Members of This PoliticalCommunity?
The divine accountability thesis and the integration thesis are both
grounded in a deep sense of political solidarity-the perception of a
collective relationship with the divine realm emerges only after people
have begun to define themselves as a political community,'37 while the
effects of integration are felt only within the communities to which one
belongs. 2 38 For the great majority of us, that sense of political solidarity is
both deeply desired and practically essential. As Richard Rorty observes,
most Americans "want to feel patriotic"-they "want to feel part of a
nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better
place." 2 39 Moreover, a deep sense of "[e]motional involvement with one's
country-feelings of intense shame or of glowing pride aroused by
various parts of its history, and by various present-day national policiesis necessary if political deliberation is to be imaginative and
productive."4
When others within one's political community are engaged in
conduct that one finds morally objectionable, therefore, it is appropriate
to take account of the toll that allowing that conduct to persist might
have on one's ability to regard oneself as an integrated member of the
community. By the same token, one must also take account of the toll
that proscribing that conduct would take on those who wish both to
engage in the conduct and to feel bound by those same ties of communal
solidarity. Reconciling those conflicting perspectives -the perspectives

235. See GREENAWALT, supra note 135, at 247 (arguing that, in the language of the Due Process
Clause, a law unconstitutionally lacks a rational basis if it cannot be justified in secular terms); cf
GEORGE, supra note 159, at 221 (arguing that participants in public debates should "appeal to
principles of justice and other moral principles accessible to their fellow citizens by virtue of their
'common human reason."'). Of course, to say that a law must be supported by reasons that any
rational person could embrace is not at all to say that a law must be supported by reasons that every
rational person is compelled to embrace.
236. See Cochran,supra note i5, at ro2-o3; see also id. at 92 (identifying himself as an evangelical
Christian).
237. See supra Part I.A-B.
238. See supra Part IB.
239. RORTY, Supra nOte IO, at 99.
240. Id. at 3.
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of the actor and of the morally offended observer-is much of what the
enterprise of distinguishing between public and private morality is all
about. Because our individual identities are partially bound up with the
political communities to which we belong,24 ' and yet we also regard
ourselves as autonomous individuals who are both equipped and entitled
to shape our own moral destinies, we all have a tremendous stake in
defining the breadth and limits of community members' freedom to chart
their own moral courses.
Two parallel spectrums are in play. Looking at the prospect of
government intervention from the perspective of one whose moral
sensibilities have been offended by others' conduct, one must calibrate
the limits of one's own tolerance. How difficult would it be to abide the
conduct and still feel that one is politically at homeh' Does the conduct
cause one to experience mere minor moral discomfort, or does it cause
one to experience a profound sense of moral dislocation? Looking at the
prospect of government intervention from the perspective of one who is
at risk of losing one's freedom to live life as one sees fit, how
fundamental to one's identity and well-being is the ability to engage in
the disputed conduct? Those spectral values must then be compared to
one another; the higher the values on one spectrum, the greater weight
that perspective ought to carry when judging the desirability of
government coercion. When the actor's conduct poses only a weak threat
to others' communal integration and the actor highly values his or her
freedom to engage in that conduct, the scales are tipped in the actor's
favor. When the actor's conduct makes it difficult for others to remain
integrated with the political community and the disputed conduct is
peripheral to the actor's ability to pursue his or her own conception of
the good life, the scales are tipped in favor of those who find the conduct
objectionable. Society's most intractable debates arise when both values
are pushed to their highest levels-as when some see the willful
termination of pregnancies as mass murder and others see it as essential
to their ability to control their own bodies and futures, for example, or
when some see same-sex marriage as a threat to the integrity of one of
society's most fundamental institutions and others see it as an essential
vehicle for expressing and protecting their deepest personal
241. See supra Part II.B.
242. Needless to say, the level of difficulty will vary in accordance with what it takes for a
particular person to regard him- or herself as integrated. Joel Feinberg argues, for example, that a
liberal national community can inspire great devotion in its members by tolerantly permitting each
individual to pursue his or her own conception of the good life. See I FEINBERG, supra note 167, at IiI12. Michael Sandel insists, however, that a society marked by liberal tolerance "cannot inspire the
moral and civic engagement self-government requires." SANDEL, Supra note i66, at 323; see also
Selznick, supra note 203, at 513 (arguing that a national community marked by liberal tolerance asks
us "to endure a thin moral order, loosely anchored in tradition, and .. . a thin sense of self, one that is
fluid, elusive, and vulnerable").
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commitments. In such hotly contested areas, our responses to the other
six questions identified here must take on even greater significance.
4. Do the Premises of My Moral DisapprovalWithstand Scrutiny?
Before arguing that conduct ought to be proscribed because it
offends our moral sensibilities, we owe it to those whose freedoms are
most sharply at stake to ensure that the grounds of our disapproval
withstand critical scrutiny. With respect to religious convictions, for
example, Michael Perry observes that human beings have a powerful
tendency to convince themselves that the divine realm's moral judgments
are no different from their own.2 43 To counter that proclivity, Perry urges
his religious readers to impose upon themselves the discipline of
ascertaining whether their religious reasons for condemning a given form
of conduct can be complemented by a secular argument that leads to the
same condemnation.2 " Using many Christians' moral objection to
homosexual sodomy as an example, Perry writes:
Because religious believers, like other human beings, are prone both to
error and to self-deceit, the religious argument that all homosexual
sexual conduct is contrary to what God has revealed in the Bible is
highly suspect if there is no secular route to the religious argument's
conclusion that all homosexual sexual conduct is immoral.245
The discipline of self-scrutiny is essential in the secular realm, as
well. In many instances, one's moral condemnation may be driven by
emotions that do not provide a reliable basis for making moral
assessments. For example, our moral disapproval may be driven by the
feelings of disgust that we experience when we view or contemplate
particular forms of conduct. Whether those feelings of disgust withstand
scrutiny is an important-and often uncertain-question. In his
argument favoring the criminalization of homosexual sodomy in
England, for example, Lord Devlin famously argued that one cannot
"ignore disgust if it is deeply felt and not manufactured. Its presence is a
good indication that the bounds of toleration are being reached.",246
Martha Nussbaum strongly disagrees, contending that feelings of disgust
often are grounded in unreasonable fears of contamination:
[W]here disgust is used as a criterion to support the prohibition of
harmless acts, the claim appears to be: "This act (or, more often and
243. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION INPOLITics 74-75 (1997).
244. See id.

245. Id. at 84.

246. DEVLIN, supra note 158, at 17. Without specifically addressing the issue of homosexual
sodomy, Peter Huang and Christopher Anderson cautiously point in the same direction, arguing that
"a shared disgust with [given] acts is a potentially relevant indicator that the acts should be abolished."
Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, Review Essay, A Psychology of Emotional Legal
Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. Io45,
1055 (2006) (reviewing MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW
(2004)).
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usually inseparable, this person) is a contaminant; it (he or she)
pollutes our community. We would be better off if this contamination
were kept far away from us. 247
Too often, Nussbaum argues, those fears of contamination are
misplaced.24' Allowing ill-founded contamination worries to drive them,
political majorities expressly or implicitly cite disgust as a reason to
justify the subordination of minorities based on such traits as race,
disability, or sexual orientation.2 49 At a minimum, feelings of disgusttogether with other emotions and premises that ground our moral
judgments-ought to be carefully examined before we rely upon them to
justify denying others the freedom to engage in conduct they deem
desirable. 50
5. Is There Any Sense in Which I Ought To Feel Morally
Implicated in Future Occurrences of This Conduct?
One finds in both religious and secular circles a tendency to feel
morally implicated in conduct in which one did not personally engage.
The divine accountability thesis posits that entire political communities
are sometimes justly punished as undifferentiated wholes,25 ' while in the
secular realm we find integrated citizens who feel guilty about communal
wrongdoings in which they played no role.252 Those perceptions then help
drive individuals to demand that governments, rather than individually
autonomous citizens, determine the moral propriety of certain forms of
conduct; government proscriptions become a means of mitigating one's
own moral culpability. It is appropriate to ask, therefore, about the
extent to which those perceptions of moral implication are well-founded
in particular cases.
This is a complicated matter, about which only a few words can be
said here. The question of what constitutes "national sins" for which
entire communities deserve to suffer is best left to those who fully
subscribe to that religious perspective.253 Looking at matters from a
247. NUSSBAUM, supra note 246, at 122-23.

248. See id. at 14 ("[Disgust's] thought-content is typically unreasonable, embodying magical ideas
of contamination, and impossible aspirations to purity, immortality, and nonanimality, that are just not
in line with human life as we know it.").
249. See id. at 321.
250. Cf Huang & Anderson, supra note 246, at 1055 ("Determinations of what is found disgusting
and why must be made.").
251. See supra notes i-so and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 184-93 and accompanying text.
253. In a 1724 sermon, Anglican minister William Lupton offered the following taxonomy:
[Sins become national sins warranting national punishments] when They have the Direct
Sanction of Publick Authority; or, when They are Unanimously espoused and embraced by
the Society, though they have no Formal Sanction from Publick Authority; or, when the
Contagion and Prevalence of Them amongst the People is become General, though not
strictly Universal; or, when the Occasions and Circumstances of them are so Conspicuous
and Flagrant, that their Rise, or Progress, or Continuance may be properly imputed to the
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secular vantage point, I have already indicated that much of the tendency
to feel implicated in a political community's wrongdoings flows from the
perceptions that our individual identities are partially bound up with the
political communities to which we belong and that political communities'
conduct reverberates in the lives of those communities' integrated
members.254 The power of those perceptions is underscored by the fact
that, in other settings, we insist upon making finely tuned judgments
about guilt, and we instinctively resist overbroad restrictions on freedom.
When a schoolteacher forces an entire class to miss its recess break on
the first day of the school year because several troublemakers were
passing notes to one another, the well-behaved child who played no part
in the wrongdoing instinctively feels that she is being unjustly punished
for others' misdeeds-in no sense does she feel that she too is culpable.55
Once we become integrated members of communities, however, things
often appear different-like the musician in Dworkin's orchestra,256 we
find our own self-appraisals being affected by the conduct of the larger
community. It thus should come as no surprise when citizens feel driven
to seek legislation proscribing conduct they regard as immoral.
Demanding such legislation might strike some as a necessary act of moral
self-preservation; indeed, the very failure to lobby for such legislation
might seem tantamount to morally condemnable acquiescence in the
wrongdoing.
As powerful as those perceptions can be, it is important to see
whether they can withstand our critical examination and should be
permitted to drive our legislative demands in specific cases. Ancient
notions of intrafamily punishments provide an interesting case study. In
its story of the Ten Commandments, the Bible describes God as telling
the Israelites that they could neither make nor worship idols, "for
I ... am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children,
on the third and the fourth generations of those who hate Me." 57 A
comparable notion of punishment once found expression in the English
criminal penalty of the "corruption of blood," by which "[a]n attainted
person lost all property as well as the legal ability to inherit or pass on
property to his heirs," thus causing wrongdoers' heirs to suffer for their
ancestors' crimes."' One can imagine the psychological and political
2

Concurrence, or Approbation, or Connivance of the State.
LUTON, supra note 84, at 13-14.
254. See supra Part II.B (discussing these perceptions).

255. The student's reaction might be different later in the school year, if her identity has become
partially integrated with the entire class.
256. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (recounting Dworkin's analogy).
257. Exodus 2o:5 (New American Standard).
258. Max Stier, Corruptionof Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of the Parents Should Not
Matter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 72'7, 729 (5992).
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presuppositions that underlay those notions: our identities are integrated
with our families, we might have said, and so, up to a point, the hardship
we suffer for our parents' crimes corresponds to our feelings of moral
culpability. In both the religious and secular realms today, however,
these notions have long since fallen out of favor. Religious leaders
appear reluctant to defend the idea that God would punish children for
sins their parents committed,' while the corruption-of-blood penalty
was banned by England's Parliament in 187o' and our own Constitution
expressly proscribes the penalty in cases of treason.6 1 Over time, we have
concluded that we ought to resist those feelings of familial culpabilitywe now insist that, no matter how much one family member might feel
integration-provoked guilt for the conduct of others, those feelings of
guilt should not be countenanced by the law.
When we are inclined to seek legislation banning conduct we regard
as immoral, it thus is appropriate to identify any sense of culpability we
might feel for the wrongdoing and ask whether, upon reflection, it
provides solid grounds for political action. To what extent are we to
blame for the conduct? Does my own moral integrity demand that I
lobby for a ban on this conduct? To what extent should I resist that
perception of culpability? Do I find that the effects of communal
integration lose their strength once I raise them to consciousness, rather
than allowing them to exert their force beneath the surface?
6. By Demanding the Government's Intervention, Am I
DishonoringAny Higher Principlesto Which I Purport To
Subscribe?
Before demanding that government ban conduct one finds morally
objectionable, one ought to be sure that, by making that demand, one is
not unjustifiably straying from overarching principles that one holds
dear. Our long-term principled commitments are always at risk of being
shoved to the side when they inconveniently conflict with our short-term
preferences.2 In the secular realm, for example, a principled
commitment to liberal tolerance would be an empty shell if there were
no occasions when we had to endure conduct that we found
259. See, e.g., John Piper, How God Visits Sins on the Third and Fourth Generation (Mar. 6, 2oo9),
http://www.desiringgod.org/ResourceLibrary/TasteAndSee/ByDate/2009/3664-How-GodVisitsSins
ontheThirdandFourthGeneration/ (declaring that the Ten Commandments story actually
means that the children of sinful generations will only be punished for their own sins).
260. See Stier, supra note 258, at 730.

261. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment
of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during
the Life of the Person attainted.").
262. One of the chief functions of a constitution, for example, is to document a community's longterm commitments, thereby helping to ensure that those commitments are not forgotten when they
stand in the way of our short-term political desires. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (x Cranch) 137,
'77 (1803).
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objectionable. Similarly, a deep commitment to equality would demand
that we treat others "as human beings who are capable of forming and
acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived," even
when we think they are living their lives unwisely. 6' Before proceeding in
the heat of the moment to demand that government vindicate our moral
judgments, we thus ought to ask whether such legislation would come at
the cost of our long-term commitment to higher principles.
One overarching principle that many of us likely regard as in play
when determining whether a given moral issue ought to be resolved at
the communal or individual level is the principle that a person deserves
moral praise only for doing those things that he or she freely chooses to
do.26 4 Each time the government declares that it will punish anyone who
engages in a form of conduct that a political majority deems immoral, the
government undercuts people's ability to attain the moral virtue that
would flow from freely choosing to engage in morally praiseworthy
conduct on their own. Of course, we ultimately must place limits on this
line of reasoning; if left to run its course unchecked, we might never
proscribe any immoral conduct at all. Moreover, as Harry Clor points
out, law is one of the means by which societies inculcate desirable moral
norms in their members, so there is good reason to doubt "that either a
good character or an authentic personality can be expected from a
regime of simple moral laissez faire."265 There nevertheless is a case to be
made-and individually weighed in each instance-that we should not
regulate individuals' lives so heavily that we deprive people of
opportunities to develop the moral traits that we believe are the
hallmarks of a well-developed individual and a virtuous citizen.
7. Do I Have Good Reason To Believe That, in This Instance,
Government Coercion-Ratherthan an Alternative Form of
Moral Encouragement-Is Essential?
Government institutions wield coercive powers that are unmatched
by any of society's other institutions. Families, churches, social
organizations, and other institutions all play vital roles in shaping
society's moral norms, but none of them has government's power to
sweep across entire geographical areas and deprive individuals of their
liberties or their lives when they behave in morally condemnable ways.
Because it is the most potent weapon in the arsenal, it is only natural to
contemplate the prospects for government intervention when we
encounter morally objectionable conduct within our geopolitical
263. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272 (1978).
264. See CLOR, supra note '57, at 137 (noting the widely held

view that free choice is essential to

moral virtue); cf RAZ, supra note 167, at 369 (noting that there is widespread support in the western

world for "the ideal of personal autonomy," which holds "the free choice of goals and relations as an
essential ingredient of individual well-being").
265. CLOR, supra note 157, at 143.
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communities. Moreover, when a problem is perceived as extending to an
entire community (as the divine accountability thesis and the integration
thesis both posit is often the case), it is reasonable to contemplate
seeking the aid of the government whose jurisdictional reach is as broad
as the troubled community." Yet society's other norm-shaping
institutions have considerable power as well. Before rushing past
opportunities to enlist those institutions in our cause, we ought to ask
ourselves whether the powers wielded by those institutions are indeed
inadequate.
Looking beyond an overarching societal commitment to individual
autonomy (about which I have already spoken),' citizens have good
reasons to think twice before demanding the aid of government when
alternative means of moral encouragement are adequate for the task.
First, difficult though it might be to imagine when we are caught up in
the heat of cultural battle, it is possible that our moral assessments are
mistaken and that we ultimately will regret forcing others to abide by our
benighted views.26 An eighteenth-century preacher told a congregation
in South Carolina, for example, that a fire in Charleston had been sent by
God as punishment for a sexual "abomination" of which, he said, not
even the residents of ancient Sodom had been guilty-interracial sexual
relations.2" One certainly assumes that preachers in South Carolina
today would denounce that moral assessment. Second (and relatedly),
government coercion robs those in the political minority of powerful
opportunities to demonstrate that the political majority is mistaken.
Jeremy Waldron and Richard Posner make the case that we are unlikely
ever to recognize the weaknesses in some of our deeply held moral
convictions unless others have a chance to engage in the conduct that we
condemn and empirically demonstrate that our assumptions about that
conduct's consequences are mistaken.270 Third, when we succeed in our
efforts to persuade the government to regulate a given moral matter to
our satisfaction today, we undercut our ability to cite the virtues of
tolerance when an election cycle gives our political opponents the upper
hand tomorrow.2 7' Finally, government coercion causes those in the
political minority to suffer-it denies them the ability to act upon the

266. Cf Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People's Affection: Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace,
56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 349-50 (2003) (discussing the shift in regulatory power from the states to the
federal government in the late I8oos and early 19oos, once societal problems started to become
national in scope).

267. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text (discussing the widely embraced tenets of
political liberalism).
268. See PERRY, supra note 16o, at 98.
269. KIDD, supra note ioi, at76-77.
270. Jeremy Waidron, Review, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 Nw. U.L.REV. 597, 6so-sI (2ooo) (reviewing
POSNER, supra note 224, at 250-52).
271I. See PERRY, supra note i16o, at 99.
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dictates of their own conscience and to engage in those activities that
they believe constitute the best uses of their lives."' Such suffering should
not be unnecessarily imposed.
Those whose public-policy demands are grounded in religious
rationales might have additional good reasons to examine the
assumption that only governmental intervention on a given matter will
suffice. John Yoder points out that many American Christians
instinctively assign "to nation rather than to church the functions of
moral discipline, of defining personal identity, and of carrying God's
action in history.""' Stanley Hauerwas sharply criticizes that popular
mode of thinking, arguing that American Christians have lost "exactly
the skills necessary to see how deeply they have been compromised by
the assumption that their task is to rule, if not the government, at least
the ethos of America," and that those Christians have thus placed
themselves in the paradoxical position of wanting the government to be
"religiously neutral" in accordance with the Establishment Clause, while
also wanting manifestations of their faith to "be more present in public
life." 274 By endorsing governmental coercion ina particular area of
citizens' moral lives, are religious believers compromising the integrity of
their faith, or implicitly conceding weaknesses in the retail power of their
religious teachings and institutions, in ways that might ultimately disserve
their commitments in the long run? Is the moral issue at stake sufficiently
important to warrant taking those long-term risks?
CONCLUSION

From the emergence of the world's first city-states to the present
day, countless people have believed that political communities must win
the favor of deities who interact with humanity along the geopolitical
boundaries that human beings have defined for themselves."' Here in the
United States, many embrace a form of nationalistic Christianity that
traces its roots to sixteenth-century Europe and asserts that the God of
the Judeo-Christian tradition causes the fortunes of the United States to
rise or fall in accordance with the conduct that its public policies promote
or permit.276 Our courts have repeatedly been asked to evaluate the
constitutional propriety of governmental efforts to align political
communities' laws with what some in those communities have believed
God desires. 7 Those efforts to conform public policies to religious
directives have fueled an overarching demand that governments be
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permitted to make moral judgments about the forms of conduct in which
individuals may engage.'
Yet the demand for morality-driven legislation is by no means
confined to religious circles. The religious worldview that posits a
political community's collective relationship with the divine realm finds a
secular counterpart in two widely held perceptions: that our individual
identities are significantly integrated with, and constructed by, the
political communities to which we belong, and that those political
communities are akin to single moral agents whose conduct affects the
moral well-being of their integrated members.2 79 When our government
behaves in ways that we find immoral, or when it permits others to
engage in morally objectionable conduct, we often find that those actions
resonate deeply in our own individual lives-we often perceive that what
reflects well or poorly on the political communities with which we are
integrated also reflects well or poorly on us individually. Sensing that our
own moral well-being is at stake, even those of us who endorse political
liberalism's commitment to governmental moral neutrality can find
ourselves inclined to seek public policies that advance our own moral
worldview.
Whether for religious or secular reasons, we thus are pulled in two
opposing directions. Deeply desiring the experience of full membership
in our political communities, and not wanting to suffer the sense of
dislocation that comes when those communities fail to provide us with a
deep moral sense of home, we want to align our governments' public
policies with what we believe is morally appropriate. Yet deeply desiring
the autonomous freedom to make our own moral judgments and to
reject the path of majoritarian morality in favor of paths "less
traveled,"" we instinctively recoil when political majorities claim the
right to deny us the ability to express our moral autonomy in ways we
find attractive. The tectonic pressure between those two conflicting
aspects of our individual and collective identities shapes much of our
nation's political and constitutional terrain.
It would be foolish to suppose that those tensions could be resolved
by trying to persuade all reasonable Americans to rally around a single
moral theory, test, or viewpoint. Our religious and moral pluralism is
simply far too pervasive, and our differing convictions far too deeply
held. Moreover, people's opinions on contested issues of public policy
are often grounded in deep-seated, emotion-laden convictions that are
unlikely to be changed by scholarly efforts to rule some of those
convictions out of bounds and to tame or harmonize the remainder with
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a unified theoretical structure. 8 Perpetual moral conflict is simply
inevitable-the lines that we ought to draw between public and private
morality are continually contested. In our collective efforts to find the
ideal relationship between law and morality, the best we can do is
identify the core questions that most citizens and scholars are likely to
regard as relevant to the overarching task." By focusing our energies on
a common set of inquiries, we have an opportunity to clarify our
positions, to contemplate changes in our stances, and to eliminate
disagreements based on misunderstandings rather than principled
differences. Perhaps most important of all, we have an opportunity to
maximize the likelihood that, even when we heatedly disagree, we can
maintain the sense of political community that drives religious- and
secular-minded individuals alike to feel so deeply invested in the publicprivate morality debate in the first place.
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